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NO FORUM TO RULE THEM ALL: COMITY AND 
CONFLICT IN TRANSNATIONAL FRAND DISPUTES 
Eli Greenbaum* 
Abstract: Recent years have seen an explosion in FRAND litigation, in which parties 
commit to license intellectual property under “fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory” 
(FRAND) terms, but they cannot agree on the meaning of that commitment. Much of this 
litigation is multinational and involves coordinating patent, antitrust, and contract claims 
across several jurisdictions. A number of courts and commentators have aimed to centralize 
and thereby streamline these disputes, whether by consolidating all litigation in one judicial 
forum or through the creation of a comprehensive arbitral process. This Article argues that 
such efforts are misguided—FRAND disputes are particularly unamenable to centralization, 
and the costs of centralizing FRAND disputes are high. Rather, absent other agreement 
between the parties, FRAND disputes should be resolved through the ordinary territorial 
structures of patent law, and attempts to simplify these disputes should focus on procedural 
and substantive coordination across jurisdictions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Patents grant territorial rights—they guard against infringement only 
within the state that issued the patent.1 In contrast, patent disputes 
                                                     
* Partner, Yigal Arnon & Co., Jerusalem, Israel; J.D., Yale Law School; M.S., Columbia University. 
1. See, e.g., Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 901 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (observing that “[a] patent 
right is limited by the metes and bounds of the jurisdictional territory that granted the right to 
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increasingly flout international borders. Patent FRAND litigation in 
particular tends to sprawl across multiple countries. In a typical FRAND 
dispute, a patentee has committed to provide a “fair, reasonable and non-
discriminatory” (FRAND) license, but the parties cannot agree on the 
definitive meaning of those terms.2 Ensuing litigation can entangle the 
parties in global snarls of the patent, antitrust, and contract laws of 
multiple jurisdictions, intertwined with questions of international trade 
policy and national security strategy. While many courts and 
commentators aim to centralize and thereby streamline these disputes, this 
Article argues against the instinct to consolidate. Rather, absent other 
agreement between the parties, FRAND disputes should be resolved 
through the ordinary territorial structures of patent law, and attempts to 
simplify these disputes should focus on procedural and substantive 
coordination between jurisdictions. 
Patentees most frequently make FRAND commitments when they are 
involved in technological standard-setting activities. Such technology 
standards often aim to facilitate global interoperability and, as a result, the 
disputes that they ignite consistently rage across jurisdictional lines.3 For 
example, a current FRAND-related dispute between Apple and 
Qualcomm involves patents covering cellular telecommunication 
standards.4 Those standards allow for worldwide communication between 
cellular devices. Such devices are built with different hardware, run on 
different software, and communicate across the separate networks of 
                                                     
exclude”); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 437 (2007) (reiterating “the general rule 
under United States patent law that no infringement occurs when a patented product is made and sold 
in another country”). The United States Patent Act is explicitly limited to acts “within the United 
States” and the importation of a patented invention “into the United States.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) 
(2012). The limited statutory exceptions to this general rule are beyond the scope of this Article. See 
generally Timothy R. Holbrook, Boundaries, Extraterritoriality and Patent Infringement Damages, 
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1745 (2017). 
2.  See, e.g., Jeffrey I.D. Lewis, What is “FRAND” All About? The Licensing of Patents Essential 
to an Accepted Standard, CARDOZO LAW (2014), https://cardozo.yu.edu/what-“frand”-all-about-
licensing-patents-essential-accepted-standard [https://perma.cc/WZB4-LVXU] (“SSOs created 
FRAND — a requirement that SSO members license SEPs on “Fair, Reasonable, and Non-
Discriminatory” terms to other members of the SSO and, very often, non-members who use the 
standard.”). 
3. See, e.g., Pierre Larouche & Nicolo Zingales, Injunctive Relief in the EU – Intellectual Property 
and Competition Law at the Remedies Stage, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL 
STANDARDIZATION LAW: ANTITRUST AND PATENTS 419 (Jorge L. Contreras ed. 2017) [hereinafter 
TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION] (observing that in a FRAND dispute, “almost every other element 
in the dispute is global or at least regional . . . the standards are global, the industry players operate 
globally, products are developed and marketed globally”).  
4. See Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
145835 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2007). 
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different countries—yet, the establishment of global telecommunication 
standards allows for easy communications across those differences.5 The 
dispute between Apple and Qualcomm over the use of those standards 
also cuts across national borders, involving civil litigation in five 
countries and related investigations by a number of national regulatory 
authorities.6 Similarly, a recent FRAND dispute between Samsung and 
Huawei involved parallel litigation in both the United States and China,7 
and another recent dispute between TCL and Ericsson generated related 
proceedings in seven countries.8 
Indeed, FRAND disputes can spawn litigation in each country in which 
standard-compliant products and services are made available. Each such 
country can see claims under its domestic patent laws (for example, 
regarding unlicensed patent infringement), antitrust framework (for 
example, regarding the unlawful use of market power conferred by 
standard-essential patents), and contract law (regarding the parties’ 
contractual obligations under the FRAND commitment).9 A number of 
jurisdictions, sometimes in an attempt to streamline the complexity of the 
transnational dispute, have recently seized the authority to make a single 
FRAND royalty determination applicable to worldwide activities. In two 
recent decisions, a United States district court set FRAND royalty rates 
for worldwide sales despite parallel foreign litigation.10 Similarly, two 
                                                     
5. Id. at *4 (noting that standards are intended “to facilitate worldwide connectivity”).  
6. Id. at *54 (summarizing litigation between the parties in the United States as well as China, 
Japan, Taiwan and the United Kingdom, and related regulatory investigations in China, Japan, Korea, 
and Taiwan). The United States Federal Trade Commission is also currently litigating related issues 
against Qualcomm. See FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 17-CV-002220-LHK, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
98632, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2017) (denying Qualcomm’s motion to dismiss claims advanced 
by the FTC). 
7. See Huawei Techs. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No.3:16-cv-02787-WHO, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
63052 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2018) (enjoining parallel litigation in China). 
8. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings Ltd. v. Telefonaktienbolaget LM Ericsson, No. 8:14-cv-00341-
JVS-AN, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191512, at *10–15 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2015) (summarizing 
litigation between the parties in the United States, as well as Argentina, Brazil, France, Germany, the 
Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom). 
9. See, e.g., Apple, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145835, at *9 (noting that the United States actions “can 
be separated into three categories: breach of contract claims, patent claims, and antitrust claims” and 
describing foreign patent and competition law claims); Huawei, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63052, at *11 
(describing the parties’ contract, patent, and antitrust claims). Regarding the use of antitrust claims in 
FRAND disputes, compare A. Douglas Melamed & Carl Shapiro, How Antitrust Law Can Make 
FRAND Commitments More Effective, 127 YALE L.J. 2110, 2111 (2018) (arguing that “antitrust laws 
have an important role to play” in enforcing FRAND commitments), with Douglas H. Ginsburg et al., 
The Troubling Use of Antitrust to Regulate FRAND Licensing, 10 CPI ANTITRUST CHRON. (Oct. 
2015) (arguing that the use of antitrust law to enforce FRAND commitments is “troubling”). 
10. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233 (W.D. 
Wash. Apr. 25, 2013), aff’d, 795 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015); TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. 
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British courts have recently asserted the jurisdiction to set worldwide 
FRAND rates over the defendant’s strident objections.11 Additionally, the 
Chinese judiciary may soon also demand the right to impose a worldwide 
resolution on FRAND litigants.12 And in the recent United States case of 
Huawei Techs. Co v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,13 the question of consolidation 
was squarely before the court.14 
This Article argues that courts should resist the temptation to 
streamline worldwide FRAND litigation through consolidation of the 
dispute in one jurisdiction. Indeed, absent other agreement between the 
litigants, standard-setting organizations should themselves disavow 
consolidation and instead require the jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction 
adjudication of FRAND disputes. Outside the FRAND context, 
commentators have wrestled with the challenges posed by multinational 
patent litigation, and a number of scholars have advocated for the 
consolidation of cross-border disputes in order to reduce the cost and 
expense of litigation across jurisdictions.15 But this Article argues that 
                                                     
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, No. SACV 14-341 JVS(DFMx), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214003 
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017). Both the Microsoft and TCL Courts found that the resolution of the United 
States litigation would be “dispositive of” related foreign litigation. See Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, 
Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1099 (W.D. Wash. 2012); TCL Commc’n. Tech. Holdings, Ltd., 2015 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191512, at *17.  
11. Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co., [2017] E.W.H.C. 711, p. 543 (Eng.), aff’d, 
[2018] E.W.C.A. (Civ) 2344 (stating that country-by-country licensing would be “madness” and that 
“[a] worldwide license would be far more efficient”); Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L v. 
Huawei Techs. Co., [2018] E.W.H.C. 808, p. 28 (Eng.), aff’d, [2019] E.W.C.A. (Civ) 38 (noting that 
without a global resolution of the FRAND dispute, the patentee would be required “to seek separate 
licenses for each individual country[,] . . . by commencing separate litigation in each such territory”).  
12. Conversant, [2019] EWCA (Civ) 28 p. 123 (describing recent guidelines issued by the 
Guangdong High People’s Court in China regarding SEP disputes, and the possibility that Chinese courts 
may assert jurisdictions to impose a worldwide FRAND resolution).  
13. Huawei Techs. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 3:16-cv-02787-WHO, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
63052 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2018). 
14. Id. at *27–28 (presenting the question of whether the court has the “ability to determine a FRAND 
royalty rate . . . whether based on global or domestic SEPs”). The Samsung case settled before the court 
could decide whether it could impose a worldwide FRAND resolution. See Huawei Techs. Co., v. 
Samsung Elecs. Co., 757 F. App’x 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
15. See generally Marketa Trimble, GAT, Solvay, and the Centralization of Patent Litigation in 
Europe, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 515, 515 (2012) (asserting that “[c]oncentrating litigation . . . [in] one 
national or multinational court could result in faster, more efficient, and more consistent” patent 
enforcement); Kerry J. Begley, Multinational Patent Enforcement: What the “Parochial” United 
States Can Learn from Past and Present European Initiatives, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 521, 526 (2007) 
(arguing that multinational patent litigation would best be handled through a “common patent judicial 
system”); Kendra Robins, Extraterritorial Patent Enforcement and Multinational Patent Litigation: 
Proposed Guidelines for U.S. Courts, 93 VA. L. REV. 1259, 1311 (2007) (asserting that American courts 
should consolidate foreign and domestic patent suits into a single proceeding); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, 
Developing a Private International Intellectual Property Law: The Demise of Territoriality?, 51 WM. & 
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allowing consolidation has produced legal uncertainty and jurisdictional 
conflict, and the costs of those uncertainties and conflicts are higher in the 
FRAND context. Moreover, FRAND disputes display distinctive 
characteristics that make such litigation particularly unamenable to 
centralization. And unlike patent litigation in general, the FRAND 
commitment’s contractual basis can be used to simplify and reduce the 
costs of territorial adjudication. As such, in the increasing number of 
multinational FRAND disputes, courts and standard-setting organizations 
should reject the global consolidation of claims. 
I. CONSOLIDATION 
This Part discusses several recent cases in the United States and United 
Kingdom in which courts have asserted jurisdiction to set global FRAND 
royalty rates—effectively consolidating a multinational dispute about 
royalties into a single proceeding. Section A provides some initial 
background on the FRAND commitment, and then reviews those recent 
cases in which courts have asserted jurisdiction to resolve multinational 
FRAND disputes. Section B describes the practical and theoretical 
problems raised by these cases. Section C elaborates on one specific 
difficulty in these cases by asking whether United States courts have 
subject matter jurisdiction to make such global royalty determinations. 
A. Cases 
FRAND litigation centers on the patent rights covering technical 
standards. Such patents are often described as “standard essential,” since 
use of the patented technology is essential for implementation of the 
standard.16 Standard-setting organizations frequently require patentees to 
commit to licensing their standard essential patents (SEPs) on FRAND 
terms.17 The FRAND commitment has two primary objectives. On the one 
hand, FRAND commitments are intended to provide assurance that the 
patented, proprietary technology is available for incorporation in goods 
                                                     
MARY L. REV. 711, 788 (2009) (advocating for the “greater use of consolidated adjudication of 
infringement claims”); Rochelle Dreyfuss, The ALI Principles on Transnational Intellectual Property 
Disputes: Why Invite Conflicts?, 30 BROOK J. INT’L L. 819, 829–30 (2004) (describing principles 
which may be used for the consolidation of intellectual property disputes). 
16. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for 
Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1135 (2013); Jorge L. Contreras, Global Rate 
Setting: A Solution for Standards-Essential Patents?, 94 WASH. L. REV. 701 (2019).  
17. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 1135. 
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and services that depend on the relevant standards.18 On the other hand, 
the FRAND commitment, and its dispensation to collect “fair and 
reasonable” royalties, is intended to allow patent owners to secure fair 
compensation for their investments in innovation.19 However, the typical 
FRAND commitment is terse and vague.20 Parties are typically left 
without clear guidance in the event of a dispute over the technology’s 
availability or the magnitude of the royalties.21 
In Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Inc.,22 one of the first judicial 
calculations of a FRAND royalty rate, a United States court imposed a 
flat, worldwide royalty rate that did not vary by jurisdiction.23 In that case, 
Motorola owned patents covering technology in wireless and video 
standards and demanded royalties from Microsoft for the use of such 
technology.24 Microsoft responded that those royalty demands were 
neither fair nor reasonable and, as such, were made in breach of 
Motorola’s FRAND commitment.25 The parties consented to the 
determination of a FRAND royalty rate by the district court, which 
proceeded to set a single, global FRAND rate for all of Microsoft’s 
worldwide sales on certain infringing products.26 The district court’s rate 
calculations blurred any distinction between United States and foreign 
patent rights versus associated royalty rates. For example, the court set 
royalty rates—including for the use of foreign patents—solely by 
employing the prevailing methodology of United States patent law.27 
                                                     
18. Id. at 1137.  
19. Id.  
20. Compare id. at 1137–38 (asserting that “[t]he effectiveness of the FRAND commitment has 
been undermined by” its ambiguities), with Joshua D. Wright, SSOs, FRAND, and Antitrust: Lessons 
from the Economics of Incomplete Contracts, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 791, 796 (2014) (asserting that 
the “intentional” ambiguity of the FRAND commitment “can be an important source of economic 
value”).  
21. Contreras, supra note 16 (explaining that “[w]ith little guidance . . . [parties] are left to 
determine FRAND royalty rates in private negotiations”).  
22. See No. C10-1823-JLR, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013), aff’d, 795 
F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2015). 
23. Id. at *14-15. 
24. Id. at *11. 
25. Id. 
26. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823 JLR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73827, at *19-22 
(W.D. Wash. June 1, 2011) (discussing the parties’ consent to the determination of RAND royalties 
by a bench trial).  
27. Id. at *48 (explaining the district court’s adoption of a modified Georgia-Pacific framework for 
determining a RAND royalty rate). See THOMAS F. COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES 66 
(2013) (noting that “there are important differences in the calculation methods” that different nations 
“actually employ” in calculating damages for patent infringement); JORGE L. CONTRERAS, Global 
Markets, Competition, and FRAND Royalties: The Many Implications of Unwired Planet v. Huawei, 
 
09 - Greenbaum.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/1/2019  3:28 PM 
2019] NO FORUM TO RULE THEM ALL 1091 
 
Indeed, for one of the standards, the court imposed a global FRAND 
royalty rate despite the fact that Motorola’s claims were limited to 
Microsoft’s infringement of United States (not foreign) patents.28 
The Microsoft Court’s assumption of authority to calculate global 
FRAND rates impelled the court to interfere with foreign litigation. 
Several months following the initiation of litigation in the United States, 
Motorola also advanced claims against Microsoft in Germany.29 In the 
German claims, Motorola alleged that Microsoft infringed on German 
patents that were covered by the same contractual FRAND commitments 
at issue in the United States litigation.30 While Motorola prevailed upon 
the German court to issue an injunction prohibiting Microsoft from 
infringing those patent in Germany, the United States district court 
prohibited Motorola from enforcing that injunction.31 The district court 
reasoned that the contractual FRAND commitment required Motorola to 
license its SEPs on a “worldwide basis.”32 As the United States court was 
charged with determining the parties’ worldwide rights under the FRAND 
commitment, and since that determination required the court to decide 
whether injunctive relief was allowed under the FRAND contract, the 
court held that allowing the injunction to be enforced would “frustrate[]” 
the district court’s ability “to adjudicate issues properly before it.”33 In 
other words, since the United States court saw the FRAND commitment 
as applying on a global basis, it prohibited the parties from enforcing the 
decision of a German court regarding territorial patent rights in Germany. 
Huawei v. Samsung34 followed a similar pattern, with a United States 
court finding that adjudication of the parties’ rights under the FRAND 
contract required the United States court to bar enforcement of a foreign 
                                                     
in 17 THE ANTITRUST SOURCE 1–8 (2017) (discussing how non-American courts can calculate 
FRAND royalties “[w]ithout the baggage of Georgia-Pacific to clutter the analytical exercise”).  
28. Microsoft, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60233, at *271 (noting that with respect to the 802.11 
standard, Motorola only presented evidence that United States patents were essential to the standard, 
“and provided no evidence regarding whether any worldwide counterpart patents were essential”).  
29. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 871 F. Supp. 2d 1089, 1089 (W.D. Wash. 2012), aff’d, 696 
F.3d 872, 873 (9th Cir. 2012).  
30. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 879–80 (9th Cir. 2012). 
31. Microsoft, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 1103–04.  
32. Id. at 1098. In the words of the appellate court that affirmed the district court decision, the 
FRAND commitment “makes clear that it encompasses not just U.S. patents, but all of Motorola’s 
standard-essential patents worldwide. When that contract is enforced by a U.S. court, the U.S. court 
is not enforcing German patent law but, rather, the private law of the contract between the parties.” 
Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 884. 
33. Microsoft, 871 F. Supp. 2d at 1100. 
34. Huawei Techs. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 3:16-cv-02787-WHO, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
63052 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2018). 
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judicial order.35 In that case, both parties owned SEPs covering 
telecommunication standards.36 The parties invested several years in 
negotiating a global patent cross-license but did not succeed in coming to 
an agreement.37 The parties commenced FRAND litigation in two 
jurisdictions: Huawei filed suit in United States district court, asking the 
court to determine the terms for a global FRAND cross-license, and also 
filed a number of patent infringement suits in China.38 Samsung 
responded with its own multinational patent, antitrust, and contract 
counterclaims in the United States and China.39 The Chinese case 
progressed quickly, and the Chinese court determined that Samsung 
infringed at least two of Huawei’s Chinese patents and issued an 
injunction against that infringement.40 Samsung then asked the United 
States court, which was still considering the FRAND issues, to enjoin 
Huawei from enforcing the Chinese injunctions.41 
The United States district court granted Samsung’s motion and 
enjoined Huawei from enforcing the Chinese injunctions.42 The court 
found that its own adjudication of the FRAND dispute would dispose of 
the Chinese questions—the FRAND commitment acted as a “contractual 
umbrella” that controlled whether Huawei had contractually relinquished 
its right to seek injunctive relief.43 As such, allowing Huawei to enforce 
the Chinese injunctions would undermine the “court’s ability to determine 
the propriety of injunctive relief in the first instance.”44 At the same time, 
the court left open the broader question of whether it had the authority to 
determine a global FRAND rate.45 
                                                     
35. Id. at *8. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at *10 (noting that the parties began negotiating a patent cross-license in 2011). 
38. Id. at *11. Huawei asserted that the United States and Chinese cases were filed simultaneously, 
but that the time differences between the two countries resulted in the Chinese cases being filed on 
the next calendar day. Id. at *11 n.5.  
39. Id. at *11–12. 
40. Id. at *12. 
41. Id. at *13–14. 
42. Id. at *7. 
43. Id. at *27 (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 883 (9th Cir. 2012)).  
44. Id. at *33. 
45. Id. at *28. Huawei and Samsung settled their dispute before the Federal Circuit had the 
opportunity to rule on Huawei’s appeal of the district court decision. See Huawei Techs. Co. v. 
Samsung Elecs. Co., 757 F. App’x 1011 (Fed. Cir. 2019). A number of United States courts have 
declined to issue antisuit injunctions in multinational FRAND disputes. In TQ Delta LLC v. ZyXEL 
Commc’ns Inc., No. 1:13-cv-02013-RGA, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98228 (D. Del. June 12, 2018), the 
court applied a restrictive test and rejected defendant’s motion for an anti-suit injunction against 
related FRAND litigation in the United Kingdom. The court asserted that a global FRAND 
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Similar issues were raised in TCL v. Ericsson.46 In that case, Ericsson 
sued the Chinese manufacturer TCL in the United States and a number of 
foreign jurisdictions for TCL’s use of telecommunications standards 
covered by Ericsson-owned patents.47 In an effort to come to a global 
resolution of their dispute, the parties agreed that a United States district 
court could make a determination of worldwide FRAND rates.48 The 
court, following a complex economic analysis, set three FRAND rates: 
one rate applicable to the United States, a second for Europe, and a third 
rate applicable to the “rest of the world.”49 The rates varied according to 
the strength of Ericsson’s patent portfolio in each of the three regions— a 
correlation that the court saw as demanded by the “fundamental 
relationship between FRAND and domestic patent law” of each 
jurisdiction.50 At the same time, the court acknowledged that this “global 
adjudication”51 by a United States court passed over the “insurmountable 
task” of addressing the “technical nuances of patent law in dozens of 
jurisdictions.”52 The court, without providing evidence, justified this 
omission by asserting that the sum of such differences would be 
“relatively trivial” and “insubstantial.”53 As in other global FRAND 
adjudications, the TCL Court also intruded into related foreign 
proceedings with an anti-suit injunction.54 As noted earlier, the TCL case 
involved litigation in seven foreign jurisdictions.55 Following the parties’ 
agreement, the district court enjoined all those proceedings, reasoning that 
the United States global royalty determination would be “dispositive” of 
all foreign patent actions.56 
                                                     
determination by the UK court would not preclude the United States court from adjudicating the same 
issues. Id. at *9. Moreover, the UK action involved at least one patent that was not a counterpart to 
patents litigated in the United States. Id. at *10. 
46. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, No. SACV 14-341 
JVS(DFMx), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214003 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2017). 
47. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (listing the jurisdictions in which the parties litigated 
their FRAND dispute).  
48. TCL Commc’n. Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktienbolaget LM Ericsson, No. 8:14-cv-
00341-JVS-AN, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191512, at *18 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2015) (noting that the 
litigants “indicated their desire that this action should result in a ‘global resolution’ of the SEP patent 
licensing and damages claims”). 
49. Id. at *83.  
50. Id. at *79. 




55. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.  
56. TCL Commc’n, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191512, at *16–19. 
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Courts outside the United States have also set global FRAND rates and 
enjoined related foreign litigation. The English decision, Unwired Planet 
Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co.,57 provides the most extensive analysis to 
date of whether a court should determine FRAND royalty rates on a global 
basis. Unwired Planet, a non-practicing entity, alleged that certain handset 
manufacturers infringed patents covering wireless telecommunication 
standards.58 Unwired Planet’s patent portfolio was subject to a FRAND 
licensing commitment and the court, in a long and detailed opinion, 
calculated FRAND rates for a worldwide license.59 The court rejected 
Huawei’s demand that any royalty determination be restricted to a 
determination of license terms for United Kingdom patents.60 Observing 
that both Unwired Planet and Huawei were companies with global 
operations, the court asserted that country-by-country licensing was 
“madness” and that a “licensor and licensee acting reasonably” in this 
situation “would [] agree[] on a worldwide license.”61 Indeed, the court 
observed that almost all comparable licenses introduced at trial were 
granted on a worldwide basis.62 The court threatened to enjoin Huawei’s 
infringing activities in England if Huawei were to decline to enter into a 
license agreement on the terms set by the court—effectively leveraging 
the possibility of an injunction in the court’s territorially limited 
jurisdiction, in order to impose global royalty rates.63 According to the 
court, this decision did not intrude onto the sovereignty of other 
jurisdictions since despite the worldwide license, Huawei retained the 
                                                     
57. Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co., [2017] E.W.H.C (Pat) 711, (Eng.), aff’d, 
[2018] E.W.C.A. (Civ) 2344. 
58. Id. at 1. 
59. Id.  
60. Huawei’s opposition to the judicial determination of a global FRAND license in Unwired 
Planet contrasts with its own position in its United States litigation against Samsung, in which Huawei 
was the party petitioning the court to set a global FRAND license. See supra notes 35–38 and 
accompanying text.  
61. Unwired Planet International LTD v. Huawei Technologies Co. LTD, 135 REPORTS OF PATENT, 
DESIGN, AND TRADE MARK CASES [R.P.C.] 757, 760, 779 (2018) (Eng.). The Unwired court asserted 
that the inefficiency of country-by-country licensing was the result of “the effort required to negotiate 
and agree so many different licenses and then to keep track of so many different royalty calculations 
and payments.” Id. at 760. At the same time, Unwired acknowledged that royalty-rates in a worldwide 
FRAND license could differ by “region” and by “standard.” Id. at 779. Indeed, Unwired divided its 
worldwide FRAND license into three regions: major markets, China, and other markets. Id. at 779–
807. 
62. Id. at 534. 
63. Id. at 793. 
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right to challenge the “validity or essentiality” of foreign patents in the 
relevant foreign jurisdictions.64 
The appeals court affirmed the decision, holding that the FRAND 
commitment that Huawei was seeking to enforce was global in scope.65 
As such, the patentee satisfied its FRAND obligations by offering Huawei 
a worldwide license, and the court was within its jurisdiction when it 
calculated royalty rates under the patentee’s contractual commitment.66 
Without such a worldwide license, the appeals court reasoned, patentees 
would be required to bring proceedings in each country worldwide in 
order to collect FRAND royalties— a framework that would incentivize 
manufacturers “to hold out country by country” until “compelled to 
pay.”67 The court further held that calculating global rates did not raise an 
unreasonable risk of conflict with comity or foreign judicial decisions, 
since “commercial courts around the world” were “familiar” with the kind 
of reasoning employed by the English court.68 Further, the global license 
imposed by the trial court did not usurp the “right of foreign courts to 
decide issues of infringement and validity” in their own jurisdictions.69 
While the FRAND license set by the trial court assumed the validity and 
essentiality of those foreign patents, the license allowed for annual 
adjustments in light of “any change in the patent landscape.”70 
As with other courts that set global FRAND rates, the English court 
also found itself ready to enjoin related foreign litigation.71 Following the 
English FRAND determination, Huawei filed suit in China and asserted 
that that Unwired Planet’s conduct had violated competition law and 
                                                     
64. Id. at 567. Indeed, during the course of the proceedings, the parties were involved in litigation 
to China regarding the validity of Unwired Planet’s Chinese patents and litigation in Germany which 
concerning both validity and infringement. Id. at 570. 
65. Id. at 793. 
66. Id. at 789. 
67. Id. at 795. 
68. Id. at 793. 
69. Id. at 764. 
70. Id. at 791. See also Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L v. Huawei Techs. Co., [2018] 
E.W.H.C. (Pat) 808, (Eng.), aff’d, [2019] E.W.C.A. (Civ.) 38 (following the reasoning of Unwired 
Planet and, in addition, rejecting claims that that the case should be dismissed for reasons of forum 
non conveniens). In Conversant, the English court found that it had jurisdiction to set global royalty 
rates even though only 1% of Huawei’s sales were in the UK. Id. at 10. The Supreme Court of the 
UK has agreed to hear Huawei’s appeal from the decisions in Unwired Planet and Conversant. See 
Eingestellt Von Florian Mueller, Supreme Court of the UK Grants Huawei’s Petition to Appeal Lower 
Court’s Claim to Global FRAND Jurisdiction in Unwired Planet Case, FLOSS PATENTS (Apr. 23, 
2019, 3:09 PM), http://www.fosspatents.com/2019/04/supreme-court-of-uk-grants-huaweis.html 
[https://perma.cc/W73U-LXX7]. 
71. Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co., [2017] E.W.H.C. 2831 (Eng.).  
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breached the contractual FRAND commitment.72 Moreover, Huawei 
sought to have the Chinese court enjoin Unwired Planet from continuing 
the English proceedings, and it argued that the English court’s decisions 
themselves breached the FRAND commitment.73 At the same time, 
Unwired Planet advanced parallel litigation against Huawei in Mexico.74 
The parties eventually compromised on these matters, though the English 
court stated that absent such compromise it would have granted an anti-
suit injunction.75 
Outside of the judicial setting, some regulatory authorities have also 
used the FRAND commitment to impose globally applicable obligations. 
For example, in 2013, the Federal Trade Commission asserted that Google 
and Motorola unlawfully sought injunctions against the infringement of 
FRAND-committed patents, including through attempts to enjoin sales of 
infringing Microsoft products in the Microsoft v. Motorola case discussed 
above.76 The parties eventually reached a consent agreement which 
limited the right of Google and Motorola to seek such injunctive relief.77 
By its express terms, the consent agreement applied to all actions for an 
injunction in any jurisdiction, and all patents of the companies 
worldwide.78 Neither the FTC statement concerning the proposed order, 
                                                     
72. Id. at 4. 
73. Id.  
74. Id. at 11. 
75. Id. at 10. 
76. Complaint, Motorola Mobility LLC, FTC File No. 121–0120 (F.T.C. July 23, 2013) (No. C-4410), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/07/130724googlemotorolacmpt.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7ZAW-ECJC]. 
77. Decision and Order, Motorola Mobility LLC, FTC File No. 121-0120 (F.T.C. July 24, 2013) 
(No. C-4410), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/07/130724 
googlemotorolado.pdf [https://perma.cc/9UZ5-QZMW] [hereinafter Google Consent Order]. The 
Google Consent Order did not limit the companies’ right to seek injunctive relief against entities that 
were outside the jurisdiction of the United States district courts. Id. at II(E)(1).  
78. Id. at I(G) (defining “Covered Injunctive Relief” as any ruling “whether in or outside the United 
States”); id. at I(R) (defining a “Patent Claim” covered by the Google Consent Order as patents or 
applications “in the United States or anywhere else in the world”); see also Statement of Federal 
Trade Commission, In the Matter of Google Inc., FTC File No. 121-0120, at 1 (Jan. 3, 
2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/01/130103googlemotorolastmt
ofcomm.pdf [https://perma.cc/WCJ6-L2QX] (noting that the Google Consent Order requires Google 
to withdraw claim for injunctive relief “around the world”). Other FTC consent agreements have also 
imposed similar extraterritorial restrictions with respect to FRAND-commitment patents. 
See Decision and Order, Robert Bosch GmbH, FTC File No. 121-0081, at IV.E (Apr. 23, 2013), 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/04/130424robertboschdo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B9YX-V4B8] (prohibiting the company from initiating any “Action” demanding 
injunctive relief for certain FRAND-committed patents, where “Action” was defined to include any 
means of dispute resolution “in the United States or anywhere else in the world”); Decision and Order, 
Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, FTC File No. 051-0094, Docket No. C-4234 (Sept. 22, 
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nor the dissenting statement of one of the commissioners, addressed the 
consent order’s worldwide scope or questioned whether a United States 
agency should impose remedies with respect to foreign patents.79 
In sum, both courts and regulatory agencies have asserted jurisdiction 
to determine parties’ obligations under the FRAND commitment on a 
global basis. In particular, national courts have claimed jurisdiction to 
resolve multinational FRAND disputes by setting worldwide royalty 
rates, and this assertion of authority has led such courts to interfere with 
the processes of foreign litigation. The next Part elaborates on the 
conflicts and complications caused when courts, without the parties’ 
agreement, assert jurisdiction to resolve the multinational conflict. 
B. Complications 
The assertion of judicial authority to resolve multinational FRAND 
disputes can raise a host of practical and theoretical problems. This Part 
locates the origin of these difficulties in the lack of a forum selection 
clause in the typical contractual FRAND commitment. A forum selection 
clause could serve as a jurisdictional anchor tying FRAND disputes to a 
specific dispute resolution process, but the absence of which allows any 
national court to claim jurisdiction to resolve the multinational dispute.80 
This Part then discusses the many conflicts and complications that emerge 
from this lack of an established dispute resolution process and the 
resulting judicial assertions of jurisdiction to consolidate a multinational 
FRAND dispute into a single forum. These complications include 
challenges to international comity, the problem of forum shopping and the 
difficulty of applying the national laws and policies of one particular 
jurisdiction across a number of countries. 
                                                     
2008), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/09/080923ndsdo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KSM3-NCU4] (defining “Action” to include any means of dispute resolution “in 
the United States or anywhere else in the world”).  
79. See Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, supra note 78; Dissenting Statement of 
Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen, In the Matter of Motorola Mobility LLC and Google Inc., 
FTC File No. 121-0120 (Jan. 3. 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases 
/2013/01/130103googlemotorolaohlhausenstmt.pdf [https://perma.cc/YDD3-RCEV]; Douglas H. 
Ginsburg & John M. Taladay, Comity’s Enduring Vitality in a Globalized World, 24 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 1069, 1087 (2017) (criticizing a “global remedy” imposed by the Korean Fair Trade 
Commission regarding Qualcomm’s FRAND licensing practices); Koren Wong-Ervin et al., Extra-
Jurisdictional Remedies Involving Patent Licensing, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Dec. 14, 2016 
(criticizing the extra-jurisdictional reach of the Google Consent Order).  
80. See also Rose Hughs, Britannia Rules on SEPs — But is it FRAND?, THE IPKAT (Feb. 21, 
2019), http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/02/Britannia-rules-on-seps-but-is-it-frand.html 
[https://perma.cc/B393-RB94] (asserting that “the heart of the problem is the reluctance of standard-
setting organizations . . . to agree to a dispute resolution mechanism”). 
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Agreements between sophisticated commercial parties often contain a 
“forum selection clause.”81 Such contractual clauses allow parties to 
choose the forum that will adjudicate disputes under the agreement, and 
such clauses may specify a particular national court or adopt alternative 
means of dispute resolution such as arbitration.82 United States courts will 
ordinarily respect the parties’ choice of forum, especially when the 
dispute arises between well-advised commercial entities.83 Courts and 
commentators recognize the importance of forum selection clauses—such 
provisions limit uncertainty and litigation costs by allowing contracting 
parties to agree on the forum for dispute resolution.84 Forum selection 
clauses also encourage international trade, since parties of diverse 
nationalities can transact business with an understanding of which judicial 
forum will assert jurisdiction over the transaction.85 
FRAND commitments are significant contractual obligations—the 
patentee makes binding commitments to the standard-setting organization 
regarding how patents will be licensed and litigated, and these 
commitments can be enforced by third parties that wish to use the patented 
technologies.86 However, unlike other weighty commercial agreements, 
FRAND commitments do not ordinarily specify a particular forum for the 
resolution of disputes regarding the commitment’s interpretation.87 In 
                                                     
81. See generally GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN 
UNITED STATES COURTS 446 (6th ed. 2018). 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 452; Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972) (holding that a forum 
selection clause should generally control, especially when “made in an arm’s-length negotiation by 
experienced and sophisticated businessmen”).  
84. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13–14; Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 33 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (courts should support forum selection clauses since they “spare litigants unnecessary 
costs . . . [and] relieve courts of time-consuming pretrial motions”); Leandra Lederman, Note, Viva 
Zapata!: Toward a Rational System of Forum-Selection Clause Enforcement in Diversity Cases, 66 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 422 (1991).  
85. Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9 (Refusing to enforce forum selection clauses “would be a heavy hand on 
the future development of international commercial dealings by Americans. We cannot have trade 
and commerce in world markets and international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our 
laws, and resolved in our courts.”).  
86. Courts have held that the FRAND commitment constitutes a binding contract, which can be 
enforced by an implementer of the relevant technology standard. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 
854 F. Supp. 2d 993, 999 (W.D. Wash. 2012); see, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 
F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1083 (W.D. Wis. 2012). 
87. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 882 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that the 
ITU patent policy does not contain a forum selection clause). A minority of standard-setting 
organizations do specify that disputes should be resolved by arbitration. See Jorge L. Contreras & 
David L. Newman, Developing a Framework for Arbitrating Standards-Essential Patent Disputes, 
2014 J. DISP. RESOL., 23, 29–30 (2014) (detailing the “handful” of bylaws and policies of standard-
setting organizations that specify arbitration as a means of dispute resolution). Forum selection 
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such circumstances, no contractual roadblock stops a court that wishes to 
assert jurisdiction over the matter. Indeed, given that technology covered 
by FRAND commitments can be made available worldwide, any number 
of courts could, in principle, assert jurisdiction over part of a FRAND 
dispute. Such courts could also—and, as summarized above, sometimes 
do—claim jurisdiction to resolve the FRAND dispute on a worldwide 
basis.88 In other words, in the absence of an agreed dispute resolution 
process, the authority that has already been asserted by certain courts to 
impose global resolutions in transnational FRAND disputes could be 
claimed by any jurisdiction.89 
This lack of an established dispute resolution process, which allows 
multiple courts to insert themselves into the same FRAND dispute, can 
result in a number of unhappy complications. First, from the most 
practical perspective, the involvement of multiple courts could result in 
inconsistent decisions.90 Different courts could impose different monetary 
royalties for the same activities, leaving litigants with confusion as to 
which rate should be followed. Courts can also provide for inconsistent 
non-monetary remedies—injunctions granted by foreign authorities have 
already been perceived by United States courts as incompatible with the 
American adjudication of a FRAND dispute.91 Moreover, litigants could 
themselves try to exploit such inconsistencies—a party unhappy with the 
                                                     
clauses should be distinguished from “choice of law” clauses, which specify the law chosen by the 
parties to govern a contract. The policies of several standard-setting organizations incorporate choice 
of law clauses. For example, the intellectual property rights policy of the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) specifies that it shall be “governed by the laws of 
France.” European Telecomms. Standards Inst., ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy, ETSI 44 
(Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.etsi.org/images/files/IPR/etsi-ipr-policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/VAV8-
Z7LK] [hereinafter ETSI Patent Policy]. It is notable that open source licenses, which like FRAND 
commitments provide licenses to intellectual property rights on a non-discriminatory basis, also do 
not typically include forum selection clauses. See ANDREW M. ST. LAURENT, UNDERSTANDING OPEN 
SOURCE AND FREE SOFTWARE LICENSING 178 (Simon St. Laurent ed., 2004).  
88. See supra Part I.A. 
89. No judicial authority can enforce its decision worldwide, but, as in Unwired Planet, a court 
could back up a global royalty determination with the threat to enjoin infringing products from its 
own jurisdiction. See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. Such a threat of exclusion from a 
major commercial center may be powerful enough incentive to compel compliance with that global 
rate determination. Id. 
90. Indeed, according to the United States Supreme Court, the potential for conflict between United 
States and foreign laws is a principal reason for the statutory presumption against the extraterritorial 
effect of United States law. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (noting 
that the presumption against extraterritoriality “serves to protect against unintended clashes between 
our laws and those of other nations”).  
91. See supra notes 29–33, 43–45 and accompanying text. 
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result in one jurisdiction could try its luck in another country, hoping for 
a more favorable outcome in the latter jurisdiction.92 
Second, this potential for judicial inconsistencies reflects a deeper 
challenge to notions of international comity. FRAND disputes begin with 
a contractual undertaking to license, but they go beyond that private 
contractual commitment to involve complexities of patent and 
competition law and policy.93 Each country’s domestic patent and 
competition law reflects the nuances of its own economic policy choices.94 
A court that seizes the authority to determine a global dispute undermines 
the authority of other jurisdictions to make their own domestic economic 
policy and provokes conflict if those foreign jurisdictions attempt to 
reclaim their own power. In the same vein, judicial interference in the 
affairs of other countries (for example, through an antisuit injunction) also 
tests principles of international reciprocity. If American courts thwart the 
effectiveness of injunctions issued by foreign authorities concerning their 
own foreign patent rights, the chances are lessened that those foreign 
authorities will themselves recognize judicial determinations from the 
United States.95 
These challenges to international comity are not limited to the financial 
issue of royalty rates. FRAND determinations rest not only on cold 
economic calculus, but also on the particular social or political bedrock of 
the jurisdiction making the royalty calculations. In the United States, for 
example, FRAND royalties may be set by an opaque jury verdict, rather 
                                                     
92. For example, subsequent to the trial court’s determination of global royalty rates in Unwired 
Planet, Huawei turned to Chinese courts and asserted that the United Kingdom courts “hijacked the 
determination of the FRAND licence” and that Unwired Planet had violated Chinese competition law 
and its FRAND obligations. See Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2017] E.W.H.C. 
2831 p. 9 (Eng.).   
93. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
94. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 455 (2007) (stating that foreign patent 
law “may embody different policy judgments about the relative rights of inventors, competitors, and 
the public in patented inventions”) (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 28, Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007) (No. 05-1056)); F. Hoffmann-
La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004) (noting that extraterritorial application of 
United States antitrust laws “creates a serious risk of interference with a foreign nation’s ability 
independently to regulate its own commercial affairs”). See also Ginsburg & Taladay, supra note 79, 
at 1086 (describing the importance of international comity in the enforcement of antitrust laws). 
95. Cf. Brief of the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 29–30, Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013) (No. 10-1491) (detailing how the expansive 
assertions of jurisdiction by United States courts caused foreign jurisdiction to curtail the recognition 
accorded to United States judicial orders).  
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than the reasoned decision of a judge.96 United States courts may also 
structure or exclude the presentation of evidence in order not to “mislead 
the jury,” while the same evidence may be available to the decision maker 
in other jurisdictions.97 Jurisdiction-specific values may also be 
incorporated in decisions regarding the non-discrimination aspect of 
FRAND. For example, Unwired Planet’s understanding and application 
of the FRAND non-discrimination commitment was to a large extent 
informed by European Union (EU) competition law—a body of law 
specific to the social and political conditions of EU.98 In contrast, at least 
one United States court has asserted that American antitrust law 
“provide[s] no guide” to understanding the FRAND non-discrimination 
commitment.99 In sum, FRAND royalty determinations can go beyond 
technocratic financial calculations to involve moral, cultural and political 
elements tied to a specific jurisdiction. A forum that takes control of a 
global FRAND dispute, with all the associated elements of innovation, 
competition and economic policy, presumes the authority to impose its 
own values worldwide. 
Third, judicial enthusiasm for global FRAND rate determinations may 
also encourage forum shopping and drive harmful competition between 
jurisdictions. Parties faced with multiple possible jurisdictions will of 
course look to file in the forum most favorable to their own position. 
Patentees will hasten to file suit with courts that impose hefty FRAND 
royalties or that issue punishing injunctions.100 On the other hand, 
                                                     
96. See, e.g., Godo Kaisha IP Bridge 1 v. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings Ltd., No. 15-634-JFB, 
2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70752, at *16 (D. Del. April 24, 2019) (finding that “the jury verdict reflects 
an appropriate determination of the FRAND royalty rate and the Court will not supplant the jury’s 
determination”). See generally Realtek Semiconductor Corp. v. LSI Corp., No. C-12-3451-RMW, 
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81678 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2014) (upholding jury determination of FRAND 
rates); Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link Sys., No. 6:10-CV-473, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110585 (E.D. Tex. 
Aug. 6, 2013) (same). 
97. Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., 773 F.3d 1201, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (in presenting damages 
evidence to the jury, “care must be taken to avoid misleading the jury by placing undue emphasis on 
the value of the entire product”); see also Norman v. Siebrasse & Thomas F. Cotter, Judicially 
Determined FRAND Royalties, in TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION, supra note 3, at 366. 
98. Jorge L. Contreras, Global Markets, Competition and FRAND Royalties: The Many 
Implications of Unwired Planet v. Huawei, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2017, at 6 (the reasoning of 
Unwired Planet “seems to conflate the competition law effects of violating a FRAND commitment 
and the private ‘contractual’ meaning of the FRAND commitment itself”). 
99. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings v. Telefonaktienbolaget LM Ericsson, No. SACV 14-341 JVS 
(DFMx), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214003, at *165 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2017). For a broader discussion 
of the differences between (and different values underlying) European and United States competition 
law, see Ginsburg & Taladay, supra note 79, at 1070–75. 
100. See, e.g., Pat Treacy & Edwin Bond, What Every SEP Owner and Licensee Needs to Know 
About the Unwired Planet Decision, IAM (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.iam-
media.com/frandseps/bristows-unwired-planet [https://perma.cc/EB93-TRSM] (Following the 
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manufacturers and implementers will rush to courts that minimize the 
FRAND royalty burden or disfavor injunctive relief. This “race to the 
courthouse,” by driving parties to quickly file suit in their preferred 
jurisdiction, can encourage litigation and throw cold water on talk of 
negotiated resolutions.101 Moreover, jurisdictions may also try to attract 
litigation business by tailoring their law and procedures in order to appeal 
to certain kinds of litigants.102 This can result in a “race to the bottom,” 
with authorities adopting increasingly inefficient legal frameworks in 
order to outshine competing jurisdictions.103 
The possibility of forum shopping also raises the question of whether 
courts and regulatory authorities will favor local technology companies. 
There is some evidence that, in FRAND disputes, authorities support 
domestic firms against foreign interests.104 As such, litigants looking for 
a sympathetic forum may run to their home jurisdiction, which may try to 
impose global FRAND rates that other jurisdictions perceive as unfair, 
one-sided, or discriminatory.105 Even if that home jurisdiction does not 
deliberately favor its native companies, the FRAND policies applied by 
the judiciary and regulators of that country may naturally be more suitable 
for its own domestic technology ecosystem. For example, businesses from 
developed countries may boast strong intellectual property portfolios, and 
their home jurisdictions may correspondingly defend intellectual property 
by imposing relatively high royalty rates and enjoining unlawful 
infringement.106 In contrast, developing countries may be more concerned 
                                                     
decision in Unwired Planet, patentees will “see the UK as attractive for FRAND litigation. It gives 
SEP owners a means of resolving global disputes where the implementer has sufficient UK sales to 
want to stay in the UK market”).  
101. Contreras, supra note 16, at 725 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
102. Id. See also J. Gregory Sidak, The FRAND Contract, 3 CRITERION J. INNOVATION 1, 1 (2018) 
(arguing that several “jurisdictions are competing in a tournament of sorts to identify the best legal 
framework for resolving FRAND licensing disputes”). 
103. See Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 245 (2016) 
(claiming that “efforts to attract litigation are socially undesirable because they are likely to produce 
inefficient pro-plaintiff law”); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable 
Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1444 (1992) (describing 
how the “race to the bottom theory claims that state competition for corporate charters harms 
shareholders by driving states” to adopt harmful legal rules). 
104. See generally Benjamin C. Li, The Global Convergence of FRAND Licensing Practices: 
Towards “Interoperable” Legal Standards, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 429, 458–61 (2016). 
105. Id. (describing FRAND decisions in the United States, China and South Korea that could be 
perceived as discriminatory against foreign businesses).  
106. See, e.g., Michael Murphree & Dan Breznitz, Standards, Patents and National 
Competitiveness, GLOBAL COMMISSION ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE PAPER SERIES NO. 40, Sept. 
2016, at 1, 7 (describing how the interests of developed and developing countries differ with respect 
to FRAND policies); Xuan Li & Baisheng An, IPR Misuse: The Core Issue in Standards and Patents, 
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with local technology diffusion and may therefore establish lighter royalty 
payments.107 This global diversity of intellectual property policies can 
exacerbate the stakes of forum shopping, since the policies of any 
individual country may not be appropriate for a worldwide resolution of 
a FRAND dispute across all jurisdictions. 
All of these issues of consistency, comity, and forum shopping take on 
greater importance in the FRAND arena, where the great majority of 
license agreements are settled through private negotiation rather than 
litigation.108 The potential for inconsistency and forum shopping muddles 
the legal background rules governing the FRAND commitment, and 
thereby makes it more difficult to successfully negotiate FRAND 
licensing agreements.109 While all commercial bargaining walks through 
the “shadow of the law”—in which the prospect of litigation looms over 
and influences negotiations—FRAND negotiators also fear the 
constraints of the ex ante FRAND licensing commitment.110 That 
                                                     
SOUTH CENTER RESEARCH PAPERS NO. 21, 23 (2009) (describing FRAND policy recommendations 
for developing countries).  
107. Murphree & Breznitz, supra note 106, at 7 (describing China’s interest in pursuing lower 
FRAND royalties).  
108. See generally Damien Geradin, The Meaning of “Fair and Reasonable” in the Context of 
Third-Party Determination of FRAND Terms, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 919, 924 (2014) (asserting 
that “thousands of licensing agreements covering SEPs” are “adopted every year through bilateral 
negotiations”); Pierre Larouche et al., Settling FRAND Disputes: Is Mandatory Arbitration a 
Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory Alternative?, 10 J. COMPETITION L. ECON. 581, 582 (2014) 
(asserting that “[t]housands of license negotiations involving FRAND-committed SEPs have occurred 
successfully”); D. Daniel Sokol & Wentong Zheng, FRAND in China, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 71, 
73 (2013) (observing that “the overwhelming majority of license agreements determined through 
bilateral negotiations without the need for any dispute resolution process”).  
109. Mark D. Rosen, Choice-of-Law as Non-Constitutional Federal Law, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1017, 
1077 (2015) (unpredictability as to choice-of-law means that parties “will be unable to conform their 
actions to legal requirements, or to intelligently bargain in the shadow of the law”); Christopher A. 
Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 719, 742 (2009) 
(noting that “relative certainty about which law a judge will apply can facilitate bargaining”). The 
legal uncertainty created by forum-shopping in patent cases was a central justification for the creation 
of the Federal Circuit. See generally J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. 
PA. L. REV. 631 (2015).  
110. The widely used metaphor of the “shadow” of the law is usually attributed to Robert H. 
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE 
L.J. 950 (1979). The metaphor symbolizes the impact of background legal rules and process on 
“negotiations and bargaining that occur outside of the courtroom.” Id. at 950; see also Melamed & 
Shapiro, supra note 9, at 2114 (observing that FRAND licensing negotiations are “heavily influenced” 
by the parties “predictions as to what the court will do if they cannot agree”); Suzanne Michel, 
Bargaining For RAND Royalties in the Shadow of Patent Remedies Law, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 889, 893 
(2011) (asserting that possible judicial remedies provide “the framework within which the parties 
bargain for a RAND royalty amount”); Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in 
Patent Cases, 101 GEO. L.J. 637, 682 (noting that in patent disputes “settlement and licensing occur 
in the shadow of expected trial outcomes”).  
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commitment provides a mandatory framework for licensing 
negotiations—bargaining outside the framework’s permitted compass 
could be taken as a violation of the FRAND contract, and agreements that 
break through the FRAND constraints could be later undone by a court.111 
However, uncertainty as to how the FRAND commitment will be 
interpreted makes it more difficult for the parties to agree on whether any 
specific negotiating position complies with the ex-ante FRAND 
constraints. This uncertainty increases the probability of litigation, and it 
makes licensing negotiations more difficult to conclude. 
In sum, when courts inflict a global FRAND resolution on parties that 
have not consented to such jurisdiction, they also raise concerns of comity 
and fears of forum shopping. This can encourage parties to race towards 
litigation, and it may incentivize individual jurisdictions to adopt 
inefficient FRAND policies in a quest for litigation business. Moreover, 
these concerns create significant uncertainty as to the resolution of future 
FRAND disputes since parties are less able to predict which legal regime 
will be applied to resolve the transnational conflict. This lack of clarity 
can hinder parties from reaching mutually acceptable royalty agreements, 
and it increases the probability that such disputes will end up in litigation 
before the courts. 
C. Jurisdiction 
Even if the consolidation of multinational FRAND litigation into a 
single forum presents the most efficient path to the global resolution of 
disputes, that path may not always be accessible through the federal courts 
of the United States. FRAND disputes typically implicate substantive 
issues of patent law. United States courts, however, have generally shied 
away from adjudicating disputes concerning foreign patent rights. As 
such, in many circumstances, United States federal courts may decline 
jurisdiction over the foreign aspects of a global FRAND dispute and may 
be required to abstain from setting foreign royalty rates. While neither the 
Microsoft nor the TCL Court addressed this jurisdiction question, in both 
cases the litigants had consented to the court’s determination of FRAND 
                                                     
111. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1056–57 (9th Cir. 2015) (upholding jury 
finding that Motorola breached its contractual FRAND obligation by making unreasonable offers in 
negotiation); TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, No. SACV 
14-341 JVS(DFMx), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214003, at *180 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017) (finding that 
Ericsson’s licensing offers did not breach the contractual FRAND obligations). In the European 
Union, parties must negotiate FRAND licenses according to specific, choregraphed steps in order to 
preserve their rights. See generally Nadine Hermann, Injunctions in Patent Litigation Following the 
CJEU Huawei v ZTE Ruling (Germany), 9 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 582 (2018). 
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rates.112 By contrast, in the recent FRAND litigation between Samsung 
and Huawei, the court noted the possibility that the court “would not be 
able to decide a FRAND rate for the parties’ global portfolios” but only 
“have the ability to determine a FRAND rate for U.S. SEPs.”113 
In the words of the Supreme Court, United States district courts are 
“courts of limited jurisdiction,” and can only hear cases as authorized by 
the Constitution and statutes.114 While the Patent Act invests federal 
courts with jurisdiction to hear actions “arising under any Act of Congress 
relat[ed] to patents,”115 there are no federal statutes authorizing federal 
courts to hear disputes arising under the foreign patent laws.116 Other 
jurisdictional hooks potentially authorizing federal courts to adjudicate 
issues of foreign patent law include the statutory rubrics of “supplemental 
jurisdiction”117 or “diversity jurisdiction.”118 However, as shown below, 
case law has repeatedly limited the competence of federal courts to 
adjudicate matters of foreign patent law under these other jurisdictional 
rubrics. As such, to the extent setting worldwide FRAND royalty rates 
requires a determination of issues under foreign patent law, federal courts 
may decline to adjudicate such matters. 
For example, the Federal Circuit has limited the authority of courts to 
employ “supplemental jurisdiction” to adjudicate matters of foreign patent 
law. Generally, supplemental jurisdiction allows federal courts to hear 
claims that “form part of the same case or controversy” of other claims 
properly before the court.119 As such, in principle, supplemental 
jurisdiction could allow federal courts to hear cases involving tightly 
related questions of United States and foreign patent law—for example, 
determining the validity of counterpart foreign patents for purposes of 
setting a global FRAND royalty. However, in the 2007 case of Voda v. 
                                                     
112. Microsoft, 795 F.3d, at 1037–40 (discussing the parties’ consent to the determination of 
RAND royalties by a bench trial); TCL Commc’n, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191512, at *10 (noting that 
the “the parties agree that the present FRAND action should resolve their global licensing dispute”). 
Despite the parties’ agreement, the courts may have been required to examine the issue sua sponte. 
See generally Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008) (courts obligated to 
“police compliance” with jurisdictional rules “sua sponte”).  
113. Huawei Techs. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 3:16-cv-02787-WHO, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
63052, at *28 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2018). 
114. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.1, at 277–83 (6th ed. 2012). 
115. 28 U.S.C § 1338(a) (2012). 
116. See, e.g., Stein Assoc. v. Heat & Control, Inc., 748 F.2d 653, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (stating that 
“[o]nly a British court, applying British law, can determine validity and infringement of British 
patents”). 
117. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2012). 
118. Id. § 1332(a). 
119. Id. § 1367(a). 
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Cordis,120 the Federal Circuit held that important values weigh against the 
American adjudication of foreign patent claims.121 In Voda, the district 
court first held that it had supplemental jurisdiction to resolve claims of 
infringement of patents issued in Canada, France, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and the European Union.122 The Federal Circuit reversed, 
asserting that considerations of comity, judicial economy, convenience, 
and fairness generally required federal courts to decline supplemental 
jurisdiction over foreign patent claims.123 According to the Federal 
Circuit, “a patent right . . . only arises from the legal right granted and 
recognized by the sovereign within whose territory the right is located.”124 
The court held that “[i]t would be incongruent to allow the sovereign 
power of one to be infringed or limited” by another sovereign.125 In 
addition, the court noted that it lacked “institutional competence” in 
foreign patent law.126 As such, according to the Federal Circuit, hearing 
foreign patent claims would not be particularly efficient and could result 
in “at least the same magnitude of litigation” as filing infringement claims 
in each applicable territory.127 
Subsequent to Voda, at least one federal district court has held that it 
does not have supplemental jurisdiction to adjudicate the parts of a 
FRAND dispute touching on foreign patents. Optis Wireless Tech., LLC 
v. Huawei Techs. Co.128 involved a FRAND dispute between two Texas 
companies. The patentee sought a declaratory judgement from the United 
States court that it had complied with its worldwide FRAND 
commitments—noting that foreign courts themselves are “increasingly 
making global FRAND determinations.”129 The district court, however, 
declined to assert jurisdiction over the claim, holding that a determination 
                                                     
120. 476 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
121. Id. at 898 (pointing to “considerations of comity, judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and 
other exceptional circumstances” as “compelling reasons to decline” supplemental jurisdiction to 
adjudicate foreign patent infringement claims). See also Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. v. Third 
Dimension (3D) Semiconductor, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 84, 91 (D. Me. 2008) (holding that Voda means 
that “it is almost always an abuse of discretion to use that supplemental power to deal with 
infringement claims involving foreign patents”). 
122. Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28102, at *3 (W.D. Okla., 
Aug. 2, 2004), rev’d, 476 F.3d 887, 905 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
123. Voda, 476 F.3d at 898. 
124. Id. at 902. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 903. 
127. Id. 
128. No. 2:17-cv-00123-JRG-RSP, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115100 (E.D. Tex. July 11, 2018).  
129. Id. at *25. 
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of whether a party had breached its FRAND obligations would require an 
assessment of foreign law “governing FRAND compliance and royalty 
rate determinations.”130 Hearing such claims would be similar to 
adjudicating “a foreign infringement claim” with respect to foreign 
patents.131 As such, following Voda’s command, the court declined to 
assert supplemental jurisdiction over the foreign aspects of the FRAND 
dispute.132 
Diversity jurisdiction also does not provide a secure basis to ensure that 
federal courts adjudicate the foreign elements of FRAND disputes. 
Generally, diversity jurisdiction allows federal courts to hear cases 
between parties that are “diverse”—for example, between citizens of 
different states.133 Unlike supplemental jurisdiction, federal courts in most 
cases do not formally have the discretion to decline to hear cases that come 
under diversity jurisdiction.134 Federal courts faced with diverse litigants 
could thus, in principle, be required to adjudicate claims concerning 
foreign patent rights—again, for example, to set global FRAND rates. 
Even so, the Federal Circuit has stated that claims concerning the 
infringement of foreign patents may be dismissed under the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens.135 Under that doctrine, a court with subject matter 
jurisdiction may nonetheless decline to hear a claim if the forum is 
inappropriate, and factors to be considered in determining the proprietary 
of the forum’ include concerns of comity and difficulties in applying 
foreign law.136 Accordingly, as per the Federal Circuit, the complexities 
of foreign patent law can justify the dismissal of a claim over which the 
courts would otherwise have diversity jurisdiction.137 
As such, under current law, whether a federal court would accept 
diversity jurisdiction over the foreign aspects of a FRAND dispute 
depends on the particular circumstances of each case. On the one hand, 
the Federal Circuit has often viewed contractual licensing disputes 
through the prism of patent law, and allocated jurisdiction over such cases 
                                                     
130. Id. at *23. 
131. Id. 
132. See also Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus. Co., No. C 11-01036 JSW, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 160370 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2011) (declining to find supplementary jurisdiction to adjudicate 
the scope of foreign patent claims in a dispute over the interpretation of a license agreement).  
133. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2012). 
134. See generally David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 587 
(1985) (asserting that “a wholesale refusal by the federal courts to adjudicate diversity 
cases . . . simply cannot be reconciled with the congressional grant of authority”). 
135. Mars Inc. v. Kabushiki-Kaisha Nippon Conlux, 24 F.3d 1368, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  
136. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981). 
137. Mars, 24. F.3d at 1376. 
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accordingly.138 That perspective of the Federal Circuit would be broadly 
consistent with a recognition that the foreign elements of FRAND 
litigation subsume related disputes under foreign patent law, and that it 
would not be appropriate for a United States court to adjudicate those 
foreign disputes and associated FRAND issues. On the other hand, at least 
one United States district court has found that a court with diversity 
jurisdiction must adjudicate a contract dispute that could potentially 
involve the interpretation of foreign patents.139 That case, however, 
involved a dispute between two United States companies and a contract 
that selected a United States forum for dispute resolution.140 In contrast, 
FRAND contests frequently involve disputes with and between foreign 
companies, and FRAND commitments do not usually specify any 
jurisdiction for dispute resolution.141 
In sum, even if foreign courts are prepared to seize jurisdiction to 
impose global FRAND royalties, United States courts may not have the 
power to make such determinations. Given the choice between forums 
that can only provide piecemeal, territorially limited adjudication, and 
other arenas that promise to resolve a global dispute, some litigants may 
prefer to press their claims in the latter jurisdictions.142 In that event, 
American FRAND rates may in many situations be determined by foreign 
                                                     
138. The Federal Circuit has frequently held that the federal courts have original jurisdiction over 
contractual licensing disputes that require a determination of patent validity or infringement, 
reasoning that such contractual disputes hinge substantially on determinations of patent law. See Jang 
v. Boston Sci. Corp., 767 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2014); U.S. Valves Inc. v. Dray, 212 F.3d 1368 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000). But see MDS (Can.), Inc. v. Rad Source Techs., Inc., 720 F.3d 833 (11th Cir. 2013) 
(contract claims requiring a determination of infringement do not arise under the patent laws). Often, 
the contractual connection to substantive patent law is tightened by the language of the contract, since 
a contract may link the payment of royalties to whether a patent is valid and infringed. Jang, 767 F.3d 
at 1337 (noting “the extent to which validity is made relevant to the resolution of the breach-of-
contract claim by the language of the contract itself”). In the same way, FRAND commitments often 
hang on whether the relevant patent is valid, standard-essential or infringed. See ETSI Patent Policy, 
supra note 87, § 15.6 (tying the definition of whether a patent is essential to whether certain actions 
infringe that patent).  
139. Fairchild Semiconductor Corp. v. Third Dimension (3D) Semiconductor, 589 F. Supp. 2d 84, 
99–100 (D. Me. 2008). See also Baker-Bauman v. Walker, No. 3:06cv017, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
23080 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2007) (exercising diversity jurisdiction over infringement claims under 
Australian and Chinese patents). 
140. Fairchild, 589. F. Supp. 2d at 100; see also Au New Haven, LLC v. YKK Corp., No. 15-CV-
3411, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77804, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2018) (holding that despite Voda the 
court can interpret the scope of a Japanese patent in the context of a dispute over interpretation of a 
license agreement, since the parties “expressly agreed to litigate all disputes related to the” license 
agreement “in New York courts”). 
141. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.  
142. See Contreras, supra note 16, at 755–56; Treacy & Bond, supra note 100. 
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courts, and United States courts may in those cases lose the opportunity 
to determine FRAND rates for the domestic American market.143 
II. THE AWKWARD FIT OF ARBITRATION 
Given the complications of consolidating multinational FRAND 
disputes, some commentators and regulatory agencies have suggested that 
such conflicts could be most efficiently resolved through international 
arbitration.144 While such assertions have mostly focused on the potential 
cost savings offered by arbitration, in principle, arbitration also offers the 
parties a means of skirting the jurisdictional squabbles of multinational 
FRAND litigation.145 If FRAND litigants agree to arbitrate their dispute, 
they could consolidate all claims worldwide into a single, comprehensive 
proceeding. The so-called New York Convention provides an 
international infrastructure for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards.146 As such (goes the argument), an agreement to arbitrate a global 
FRAND dispute, and the ensuing arbitral determination of global FRAND 
royalty rates, would, pursuant to the Convention, be recognized and 
enforced in all major jurisdictions. In other words, international 
arbitration offers a ready and recognized means for the resolution of 
                                                     
143. Cf. Optis Wireless Tech., LLC v. Huawei Techs. Co., No. 2:17-cv-00123-JRG-RSP, 2018 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115100, at *25 (E.D. Tex. July 11, 2018) (rejecting plaintiff’s arguments that 
“foreign courts are increasingly making global FRAND determinations, and it would be unfair if 
United States courts did not follow that trend”). 
144. See generally Contreras & Newman, supra note 87, at 23 (listing parties recommending the 
use of arbitration to resolve FRAND disputes); Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee: Setting Out the EU 
Approach to Standard Essential Patents, at 11 (Nov. 29, 2017), 
https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/26583/attachments/1/translations/en/renditions/native 
[https://perma.cc/G6T5-D8ZK] (arbitration and mediation offer “offer swifter and less costly dispute 
resolution”). Indeed, a minority of Standard Development Organizations already incorporate 
mandatory forum selection and dispute resolution clauses in their intellectual property policies. See 
Contreras & Newman, supra note 87 passim. 
145. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 1163–64 (asserting that arbitration of FRAND disputes 
can “moot” comity concerns in multinational FRAND disputes); MUNICH IP DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
FORUM, FRAND ADR CASE MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES 16 (2018) [hereinafter Munich FRAND 
ADR Guidelines], http://www.ipdr-forum.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/frand-
guidelines_helvetica_rz6_klein_online.pdf [https://perma.cc/L4KY-TPVN](asserting that referring a 
FRAND dispute to arbitration “makes it possible to obtain a global solution”).  
146. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 1, June 10, 
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. See also NIGEL 
BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 61 (6th ed. 2015) 
(describing the importance of the New York Convention to the recognition and enforcement of 
international arbitration). 
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transnational disputes, and this structure could also be employed to bring 
FRAND royalty disputes to a comprehensive, global conclusion.147 
Nevertheless, despite the advantages of an agreed arbitral process, 
arbitration should not be the default option for the resolution of 
multinational FRAND disputes. Conflicts regarding the magnitude of 
FRAND royalties can incorporate commercial, legal, and policy 
complexities that are inappropriate for arbitration, either because the 
resolution of those issues requires prior (and perhaps unachievable) 
agreement on the parameters of the arbitral process, or because those 
issues touch on non-arbitrable matters of public concern. As a result, in 
many circumstances arbitration will not be able to provide a final, 
conclusive resolution of the dispute, and closure will in any event require 
litigation in national courts. Standard-setting organizations, perhaps for 
these reasons, have generally not mandated that FRAND royalty disputes 
be resolved through arbitration.148 The following sections catalog the 
complexities of consolidating FRAND disputes through arbitration—
section A spotlights issues connected to patent validity and infringement, 
section B focuses on matters of antitrust and competition law, and section 
C looks at the complications of constructing a generally applicable arbitral 
framework for FRAND conflicts. 
A. Patent Validity and Infringement 
Mandating the use of arbitration for the resolution of FRAND disputes 
would require consensus on an acceptable arbitral framework. Most 
importantly, participants would need to decide whether to incorporate 
challenges to patent validity and determinations of infringement in any 
agreed arbitral process.149 Consensus on this matter, however, has, to date, 
                                                     
147. Arbitration also offers other well-known advantages. For multinational FRAND disputes, for 
example, arbitration allows the party to aim for neutrality, expertise, flexibility, and confidentiality in 
the dispute resolution process. In addition, a responsive arbitral process may be able to assist the 
parties in customizing an appropriate resolution, including coming to a mutual agreement on the 
broader structure of a full FRAND license agreement. See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 
No. 11-cv-178-bbc, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187878, at *20 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 8, 2012) (asserting that 
binding arbitration would allow the parties to resolve the dispute since they would “be able to 
negotiate any and all of the many aspects of their licensing agreement”). Analysis of these other 
purported advantages of FRAND arbitration is beyond the scope of this Article. 
148. See Contreras & Newman, supra note 87, at 29–30 (listing a “handful” of standard-setting 
organizations that require dispute resolution through arbitration).  
149. Litigants may also dispute whether “essentiality” should be considered within the arbitral 
proceedings—whether a patent declared by one of the litigants as “standard-essential” is correctly 
described as such. For reasons why litigants may wish to dispute patent essentiality separately from 
the question of infringement, see Jorge L. Contreras, Essentiality and Standard Essential Patents, in 
TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION, supra note 3, at 209, 225. 
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eluded participants in the standard-setting process. On the one hand, 
addressing questions of validity and infringement within the arbitral 
framework is necessary to achieve a full resolution of the dispute. Indeed, 
manufacturers have balked at participating in proposed arbitral 
frameworks in which these issues were not addressed.150 On the other 
hand, the determination of validity and infringement for even a single 
patent ordinarily requires lengthy and expensive litigation, and the cost of 
arbitrating these issues across an entire portfolio would seem to 
undermine much of the efficiencies that could be achieved through arbitral 
proceedings.151 Perhaps reflecting the difficulty of coming to a consensus 
on these questions, proposed institutional frameworks for FRAND 
arbitration have not taken a definitive position regarding the extent to 
which validity and infringement should be addressed in arbitration.152 
                                                     
150. For example, the Google Consent Order allowed FRAND royalty terms to be set through 
arbitration. See Google Consent Order, supra note 77, at III.C.2 (providing that a potential licensee 
may elect to have contested FRAND terms resolved through “Binding Arbitration”). Some 
manufacturers expressed concern that the proposed arbitral process of the Google Consent Order 
deviated from ordinary legal requirements to assess patent validity, essentiality, and infringement. 
See Letter from E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Attn., Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP, to Donald S. Clark, 
Sec’y, Fed. Trade Comm’n at 7 (Feb 22, 2013) [hereinafter Apple FTC Comments], 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_comments/2013/02/563708-00029-
85598.pdf [https://perma.cc/BU7G-QUKU] (requesting that the FTC clarify that “these issues [of 
patent validity and infringement] must be decided in any arbitration” and that nothing in the Google 
Consent Order should be understood to “shift the traditional burdens of proof” regarding these 
matters); Munich FRAND ADR Guidelines, supra note 145, at 11 (noting that implementers 
“particularly criticized” a proposed arbitration framework that limited assessments of patent validity, 
essentiality and infringement). Objections to arbitral procedures that do not definitively settle issues 
of validity may also come from patentees. See Larouche, supra note 108, at 602 (asserting that patent 
owners will be undercompensated “in any world where arbitration is mandatory but validity 
challenges are possible”).  
151. Larouche, supra note 108, at 607 (claiming that “any purported efficiencies or cost savings 
resulting from the arbitration are eliminated” if the procedure requires consideration of ancillary 
issues such as patent validity); Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 1152 (noting that FRAND arbitral 
procedures which allow for the presentation of evidence concerning validity and infringement will 
not be “an easy matter” and will involve “extensive discovery”). Some commentators have suggested 
that an efficient arbitral process need not make final determinations regarding patent validity, but 
could instead simply take evidence regarding validity into account in setting a FRAND royalty rate. 
See id.; Contreras, supra note 16, at 730 n.140. Notwithstanding the potential efficiencies of such a 
process, it currently seems implausible that manufacturers would generally agree to a default arbitral 
framework in which they waive their rights to challenge validity and infringement within the arbitral 
process.  
152. See, e.g., WIPO ARBITRATION & MEDIATION CTR., GUIDANCE ON WIPO FRAND 
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR) 7, https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/amc/en/docs 
/wipofrandadrguidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5VW-UFGH] (noting that “[i]n the interest of time and 
cost-efficiency . . . the parties may agree to limit claims or defenses that they may bring in the ADR 
proceedings, including patent essentiality, validity, infringement, and enforceability”); Eli Greenbaum, 
Forgetting FRAND: The WIPO Model Submission Agreements, LES NOUVELLES, June 2015, at 81, 85 
(noting that the template WIPO FRAND arbitration submission agreements “avoid creating specific rules 
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Even if litigants were to agree on a mechanism for addressing patent 
validity within the arbitral process, the resulting award may not be 
enforceable in important jurisdictions. As such, it may be impossible to 
consolidate an entire FRAND dispute into a single arbitration since some 
jurisdictions will always allow parallel, and possibly duplicative, 
litigation regarding patent validity in national courts. For example, China, 
Germany, France, and the Netherlands all consider issues of patent 
validity to involve non-arbitrable matters of public policy.153 As the New 
York Convention does not require courts to enforce arbitral awards that 
violate public policy, those countries are unlikely to enforce foreign 
arbitral awards that make determinations regarding patent validity.154 
Moreover, courts in those jurisdictions may refuse to stay local litigation 
regarding patent validity even if the parties separately proceed with a 
related FRAND arbitration.155 In other words, no agreed arbitral process 
can provide a comprehensive, final pronouncement of judgement in 
multinational FRAND disputes, since matters of patent validity will likely 
remain as loose ends to be tied up through litigation in national courts. 
Moreover, even if parties agree on a mechanism for the arbitration of 
patent validity, and even if the relevant jurisdictions would enforce the 
arbitral award, that award may need to be later reexamined. Many 
countries that allow for the arbitration of patent validity only give inter 
partes effect to the arbitral award.156 According to these jurisdictions the 
determination of patent validity in the arbitral award would not control in 
subsequent FRAND disputes with third parties, and in those subsequent 
disputes the question of validity would need to be relitigated. This 
requirement to revisit issues of patent validity will of course weigh down 
                                                     
to address . . . claims of invalidity in the FRAND context”); Munich FRAND ADR Guidelines, supra 
note 145, at 26 (presenting a menu of options for addressing patent validity within an arbitration).  
153. See generally M.A. Smith et al., Arbitration of Patent Infringement and Validity Issues 
Worldwide, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 299, 305 (2006) (discussing the laws of a large “group of states” 
that do “not allow the arbitration of claims involving the validity of a patent”). 
154. See New York Convention, supra note 146, art. V(2)(b) (providing that “[r]ecognition and 
enforcement of an arbitral award” may be refused if “contrary to the public policy”); Smith, supra 
note 153, at 303 (noting that awards concerning patent validity might violate public policy in certain 
jurisdictions).  
155. Id.; supra note 146, art. II(3) (courts not required to refer parties to arbitration if it finds that 
the agreement is “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed”).  
156. See M.A. Smith, supra note 153, at 305 (observing that in patent arbitration, “[t]he effect of 
the award . . . generally remains inter partes. Thus, an arbitral tribunal award finding a patent invalid 
generally will not preclude the enforcement of that patent against nonparties to the arbitration”); 35 
U.S.C § 294(c) (2012) (“An award by an arbitrator shall be final and binding between the parties to 
the arbitration but shall have no force or effect on any other person.”).  
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subsequent FRAND disputes with duplicative costs.157 More importantly, 
however, the limited effect given to arbitral determinations of patent 
validity conflicts with the FRAND “non-discrimination” requirement. 
Though the meaning of the non-discrimination is open to interpretation, 
at base it demands some manner of consistency between the commercial 
terms granted to different licensees.158 However, that requirement may be 
violated if, for example, a particular arbitral panel decides that a patent is 
valid and awards royalties for its infringement, even as other licensees are 
not required by subsequent decision-makers to make royalty payments for 
the same patent.159 As such, any arbitral award may need to be 
reconsidered in order to adjust the awarded FRAND rate in light of 
subsequent decisions. This non-discrimination requirement, and the 
possibility that any arbitral award will need to be repeatedly revisited, 
would frustrate the consolidation of a FRAND dispute into a single 
definitive, arbitral proceeding. 
B. Antitrust 
Efforts to consolidate multinational proceedings through arbitration 
may also be thwarted by the antitrust aspects of FRAND disputes. As 
discussed above, FRAND disputes can include claims under domestic 
antitrust and competition law.160 Many jurisdictions would allow for the 
arbitration of such competition law claims.161 At the same time, however, 
                                                     
157. These costs may be higher in the FRAND context. FRAND-committed patents—being 
essential to required technological standards—are typically the subject of numerous license 
agreements, and are litigated more frequently than other patents. See generally Timothy Simcoe et 
al., Competing on Standards? Entrepreneurship, Intellectual Property, and Platform Technologies, 
18 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 775 (2009). 
158. Eli Greenbaum, Nondiscrimination in 5G Standards, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 55 (2018). 
159. See, e.g., M.A. Smith, supra note 153, at 324 (noting that “[a] finding of invalidity” in 
arbitration “amounts to a permanent license of the patent for the accused infringer: the arbitration is 
binding under the doctrine of res judicata with respect to the accused infringer, and the patent may 
still be enforced against nonparties”); cf. Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij BV v. Standard 
Microsystems Corp., 925 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (beneficiary of a “Most Favored License” 
clause claiming that the clause is triggered by an arbitral proceeding and ensuing agreement granting 
another party “immunity from suit”).  
160. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.  
161. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628–40 (1985) 
(allowing arbitration of antitrust claims under United States law). See also Vera Korzun, Arbitrating 
Antitrust Claims: From Suspicion to Trust, 48 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 867 (2016) (discussing the 
arbitrability of antitrust claims in the United States and the European Union). Of course, participants 
in the standard-setting process that intend to require arbitration of antitrust and competition law claims 
need to draft the FRAND commitment in a manner that requires arbitration of such claims. See Zoran 
Corp. v. DTS, Inc., No. C 08-4655 JF (HRL), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6675, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 
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countries also often see their domestic competition law as implicating core 
issues of public policy.162 As such, as with matters of patent validity, 
under the New York Convention countries may refuse to enforce arbitral 
awards that their national courts view as inconsistent with domestic 
competition policy.163 In addition, many jurisdictions provide that arbitral 
awards regarding competition law do not have preclusive effect beyond 
the parties to the arbitration.164 As discussed above, this lack of preclusive 
effect may be fundamentally inconsistent with the FRAND non-
discrimination requirement and may result in the reexamination of arbitral 
awards that conflict with subsequent decisions concerning the same 
FRAND commitments. These issues, again as with matters of patent 
validity, may preclude the consolidation of a FRAND dispute into a final, 
comprehensive arbitral proceeding. 
C. Framework of the Arbitral Process 
A generally applicable arbitral framework would require agreement on 
the national law used to adjudicate the dispute, since the principles for 
resolving FRAND disputes vary by country. For example, different 
jurisdictions apply different methodologies for calculating FRAND 
royalties and damages.165 Similarly, jurisdictions take diverse positions on 
                                                     
2009) (finding arbitration clause of a standard-setting organization was not drafted to require 
arbitration of associated antitrust claims). 
162. Korzun, supra note 161, at 906. See also Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638 (holding that with respect 
to the arbitration of antitrust claims, “the national courts of the United States will have the opportunity 
at the award-enforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the antitrust 
laws has been addressed”); Munich FRAND ADR Guidelines, supra note 145, at 17 (noting that in 
Europe, “awards by arbiter tribunals in FRAND disputes must recognize competition law as a matter 
of public policy”).  
163. For example, under the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)’s decision in 
Genentech v. Hoechst GmbH, No. C-567/14, 2016 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS ¶ 40 (July 7, 2016), a 
FRAND arbitral award may be challenged under European Union competition law if the award 
provides for a license that cannot be terminated. In Genentech, the CJEU was asked to set aside an 
arbitral award concerning patent royalties. The arbitral panel had held that a license agreement did 
not violate European competition law by requiring the payment of royalties on patents that had 
subsequently been found invalid. The CJEU held that the arbitral award did not violate European 
competition law since the license agreement could be terminated. However, license agreements that 
required payment of royalties on patents found invalid, and which did not include a right to terminate, 
could be challenged under EU competition law.  
164. See, e.g., Alexandra Theobald, Mandatory Antitrust Law and Multiparty International 
Arbitration, 37 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1059, 1066 (2016).  
165. See, e.g., Contreras, supra note 16, at 718–22 (listing “controversies” regarding the applicable 
principles for the calculation of FRAND royalties); Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co. 
Ltd. [2017] E.W.H.C. (Pat) 711 p. 97 (rejecting the ex ante approach of United States courts to 
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how strictly the FRAND non-discrimination requirement should be 
interpreted.166 National law could, in principle, even differ as to whether 
a FRAND commitment exists at all.167 In other words, in certain 
situations, it may be difficult for an arbitral tribunal to identify sufficiently 
concrete principles for assessing FRAND royalties without making 
reference to specific national law.168 In trying to set out the framework for 
a FRAND arbitration, each party would push for the governing law most 
favorable to its position. This tug-of-war could be especially fierce in 
multinational patent litigation between firms of different nationalities. A 
generally applicable arbitral framework could be impossible to achieve if 
the parties cannot even agree on what law should govern the dispute.169 
                                                     
FRAND royalty calculations, in which FRAND “represents the rate which would be agreed . . . before 
the patented invention is adopted into the standard”). 
166. Compare Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co., [2017] E.W.H.C. (Pat) 711p. 501 
(Eng.), aff’d, [2018] E.W.C.A. (Civ) 2344 (holding that the FRAND non-discrimination commitment 
is not violated unless the different royalties paid by licensees would “distort competition” between 
them), with TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings v. Telefonaktienbolaget LM Ericsson, No. SACV 14-341 
JVS(DFMx), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214003, at *165 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2017) (holding that 
competition law provides “no guide to understanding ETSI’s non discrimination” commitment). See 
also Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co. Ltd. [2018] EWCA (Civ) 2344 p. 77 (presenting 
Huawei’s arguments that Chinese approaches to the FRAND non-discrimination requirement differ 
from the approach taken by the English court of first instance).  
167. See, e.g., FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 17-CV-00220-LHK, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190051, at 
*48 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2018) (holding that certain FRAND commitments required Qualcomm to 
“license its SEPs to modem chip suppliers”). Qualcomm had contended that such a requirement was 
contrary to “industry practice.” Id. at *43. Other jurisdictions could take a contrary position. See Jorge 
Padilla & Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Portfolio Licensing to Makers of Downstream End-User Devices: 
Analyzing Refusals to License FRAND-Assured Standard-Essential Patents at the Component Level, 
62(3) THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN 494, 507 (2017) (asserting that in many circumstances there may be 
“no justification” for compelling an SEP holder to license on FRAND terms to component 
manufacturers); see also LG Offered Nokia Privateer Conversant Less than 1% of the Standard-
Essential Patent License Fees It Demands—And Even That Turns Out Unwarranted, FOSS PATENTS 
(Apr. 25, 2019) http://www.fosspatents.com/2019/04/lg-offered-nokia-privateer-conversant.html 
[https://perma.cc/3VSF-78SV] (describing a French court’s holding that “FRAND licensing 
obligations apply only to actually essential patents, not merely declared-essential ones” but that 
“there’s an alternative approach according to which a patent holder’s FRAND declaration applies to 
non-essential patents as well”). 
168. See Note, General Principles of Law in International Commercial Arbitration, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 1816, 1819 (1988) (asserting that arbitral proceedings based on general principles of law rather 
than specific national law “become unpredictable, and parties to agreements have little ground on 
which to base their expectations”); Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Out of National Law: An 
Empirical Look At the New Law Merchant, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 523, 533 (2005). 
169. See, e g., Eli Greenbaum, Arbitration Without Law: Choice of Law in FRAND Disputes, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. RES GESTAE 1 (2016) (describing an example of an international FRAND 
arbitration where the parties from different jurisdictions could not agree on what national law should 
apply to the determination of a FRAND royalty rate); Unwired Planet [2018] E.W.C.A. (Civ) 2344 
p. 78 (Eng.) (presenting Huawei’s arguments that the decision of the English court calculated royalties 
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Moreover, disputes regarding the magnitude of FRAND royalties may 
only be amenable to resolution within the context of a basic agreement on 
license terms. Such license terms could include provisions of substantial 
commercial importance—for example, the period covered by the license, 
the relevant royalty base, and whether the licensee holds patents of 
sufficient importance to make a cross-license (and a corresponding 
reduction in royalty rates) valuable to the patentee.170 All of these terms 
impact the commercial transaction’s rewards and therefore bear on the 
magnitude of the FRAND royalties.171 As such, unless the disputants can 
come to at least some initial agreement on a licensing framework, an 
arbitral panel may not have any objective basis for choosing between any 
of these commercial terms. In short, bringing a FRAND arbitration to a 
successful conclusion requires the litigants to begin with an agreed, 
workable outline for adjudicating disputed license terms. Using 
arbitration as a default option for settling FRAND disputes, however, may 
assume a level of cooperation between the parties that does not in fact 
exist.172 
                                                     
and damages “on a different basis from that which the competent courts” of other jurisdictions “would 
have adopted”).  
170. Apple Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., No. 11-cv-178-bbc, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187878, at 
*17–18 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 8, 2012) (detailing the surrounding commercial terms necessary to assess a 
FRAND rate); Apple and Google Disagree on Key Parameters of Potential FRAND Arbitration, 
Including Scope, FOSS PATENTS (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/11/apple-and-
google-disagree-on-key.html [https://perma.cc/3RPL-LTX7] (describing key disagreements between 
Google and Apple regarding the scope of a possible arbitration to settle a FRAND dispute). See also 
TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings v. Telefonaktienbologet LM Ericsson, No. SACV 14-00341 JVS 
(ANx), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101920, at *15 (C.D. Cal. July 25, 2016) (noting that thirteen terms 
of a license agreement, aside from the royalty rate, were disputed between the parties). 
171. See J. Gregory Sidak, Mandating Final-Offer Arbitration of FRAND Royalties for Standard-
Essential Patents, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 14 (2014) (asserting that “licensing terms are 
multifaceted and often include forms of consideration beyond the royalty itself” and “[t]o reduce the 
entire dispute to a single number is not only arbitrary, but also not indicative of actual FRAND 
terms”). 
172. Some industry players offered the same criticisms regarding the proposed arbitral procedures 
in the Google Consent Order. For example, Apple asserted that that the arbitral procedure could “fail 
at the outset because the parties are unable to agree on the terms or scope of arbitration.” See Apple 
FTC Comments, supra note 150, at 8. Qualcomm provided the FTC with similar comments. See  
Qualcomm Inc.’s Response to the Commission’s Request for Comments on the Proposed Agreement 
Containing Consent Order at 16, In the Matter of Motorola Mobility LLC & Google Inc., FTC File 
No. 121-0120 (Jan. 11, 2013), [hereinafter Qualcomm FTC Comments], 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_comments/2013/02/563708-00022-
85574.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UJX-2PWA] (“A license agreement, like any contract, must be 
construed as a whole, with no term decided or interpreted in isolation.”). But see Lemley & Shapiro, 
supra note 16, at 1144 n.26 (suggesting that in a FRAND arbitration, the arbitrator should not “resolve 
disputes over other non-price license terms . . . the FRAND obligation doesn’t compel any such terms, 
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In sum, international arbitration does not present a straightforward path 
towards the unified resolution of FRAND disputes in a single 
proceeding.173 But the obstacles that impede such arbitral consolidation 
demonstrate two truths about the FRAND commitment. First, the FRAND 
commitment implicates matters of public interest that can extend beyond 
a private licensing dispute between two parties.174 Second, efforts at 
dispute resolution can founder without national law to give jurisprudential 
shape to both the substantive and procedural aspects of the FRAND 
commitment, since the parties may not be able to agree on the framework 
and scope of dispute resolution proceedings without the constraints of 
national law. In other words, the meaning of the FRAND commitment 
depends on background national law, and authorities in different 
jurisdictions can require interpretations of the FRAND commitment to 
respect broader public and normative demands. The difficulties of 
creating a comprehensive FRAND arbitral framework shows that the 
FRAND commitment cannot be extracted and given abstract meaning 
outside of the structures of national law.175 
III. TERRITORIAL ADJUDICATION 
This Article proposes that FRAND commitments should be modified 
to provide that, absent other agreement by the parties, the national courts 
of each country will have jurisdiction for FRAND licensing 
determinations only for patents issued by that territory.176 Section A of 
                                                     
so the arbitrator should not have to resolve them”); Contreras, supra note 16, at 745 (proposing that 
arbitrators determine only a FRAND royalty rate but no other commercial terms). 
173. Perhaps in recognition of the difficulty of consolidating a global FRAND dispute into a single 
arbitral proceeding, the Munich FRAND ADR Guidelines recommend that litigants consider 
resolving the economic calculations of FRAND royalties through arbitration, even as national courts 
retain jurisdiction to resolve issues of infringement, validity and essentiality. See Munich FRAND 
ADR Guidelines, supra note 145, at 20. 
174. Cf. Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
145835, at *53–54 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2017) (noting that the licensing dispute between the two parties 
involved matters of public policy and that “it is far from accurate to say that this is a paradigmatic 
‘private contractual dispute’ that only implicates the rights and obligations among Apple and 
Qualcomm . . . . [T]his dispute implicates global public concerns”). 
175. Commentators have raised other concerns regarding the suitability of arbitration for the 
resolution of FRAND disputes, including whether arbitral panels will properly value intellectual 
property assets and whether arbitral panels will allow sufficient discovery. See generally Sidak, supra 
note 171. Such concerns are beyond the scope of this Article. 
176. The proposal for territorial adjudication advanced by this Article does not address the separate 
question of which substantive law should be applied by national courts in FRAND disputes. Some 
standard-setting organizations may provide for choice-of-law rules in their own patent policies. See supra 
text accompanying note 87 (discussing the ETSI choice-of law clause). Nevertheless, after analyzing 
applicable conflict of law rules, courts may nonetheless hold that the law specified by a patent policy is 
 
09 - Greenbaum.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/1/2019  3:28 PM 
1118 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1085 
 
this Part discusses the advantages presented by the territorial adjudication 
of FRAND claims. Section B addresses objections to territorial 
adjudication that have been raised by courts and commentators. This 
Article argues that while such objections may be compelling in the context 
of general patent litigation, they have less salience in the FRAND setting. 
For FRAND litigation, unless the parties agree otherwise, the nature of 
the dispute presents no real alternative to territorial adjudication. 
Moreover, as detailed in section C, the FRAND commitment itself 
provides a means for mitigating the complexities and costs of jurisdiction-
by-jurisdiction litigation.177  
Under this proposal, neither the English court in Unwired Planet nor 
the United States district courts in Microsoft, TCL, and Samsung would 
have possessed the authority to set global FRAND royalty rates. Rather, 
the English court’s authority would have been limited to FRAND 
determinations for United Kingdom patents, and the authority of the 
Microsoft, TCL, and Samsung courts would have been limited to setting 
royalty rates for United States patents. To the extent the litigating parties 
                                                     
not the law that should be used to calculate FRAND royalties. See Yangi Li & Nari Lee, European 
Standards in Chinese Courts – A Case of SEP and FRAND Disputes in China, in GOVERNANCE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA AND EUROPE 266 (Nari Lee et al. eds., 2016) (describing how 
Chinese courts calculated FRAND royalties under Chinese law, rather than the French law governing the 
ETSI patent policy). It is also assumed that, regardless of whether a patent policy includes a choice-of-law 
clause, jurisdictions will always apply their own domestic patent and competition laws. See, e.g., u-blox 
AG v. InterDigital, Inc., No. 3:19-cv-001-CAB-(BLM), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62816, at *6–9 (S.D. Cal. 
Apr. 11, 2019) (analyzing a breach of contract claim under the French law that governed the applicable 
FRAND licensing commitment, but analyzing antitrust claims associated with the breach of such FRAND 
commitment under United States antitrust law). 
177. The American Law Institute (ALI) has proposed principles for the adjudication of 
transnational intellectual property disputes and, consistent with the arguments presented by this 
Article, such principles would also seem to disfavor the consolidation of a global FRAND royalty 
dispute in a single jurisdiction. See generally AM. LAW INST., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES 
GOVERNING JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES (2008) 
[hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]. A “crucial factor” for permitting consolidation under the ALI 
Principles is whether there exists a single court with jurisdiction to hear the entire dispute—which is 
unlikely to be the case for FRAND disputes that involve multijurisdictional challenges to patent 
validity, assessments of essentiality and infringement, and questions of competition law. Id. § 222, 
Ill.2.c. Other factors weighing against consolidation under the ALI Principles include the risk of 
inconsistent judgements and the risk that the “judgement resulting from consolidated proceedings will 
[not] be enforceable in other [countries].” Id. § 222(1)(g)–(h). As noted above, a number of FRAND 
disputes to date have resulted in inconsistent judgements and the cross-jurisdictional conflicts to date 
present strong risks that a global FRAND determination in one jurisdiction will not be enforceable in 
another territory. Moreover, the ALI Principles note that certain technical patent issues may best be 
resolved in the jurisdiction where the patent right is registered. Id. § 222 cmt. 5. The ALI Principles 
also note that cases which involve a multiplicity of claims (such as FRAND cases, which typically 
involve related patent, antitrust, and contract claims) may not best be resolved by consolidating global 
claims in one court. Id. § 221 cmt. c; see also Dreyfuss, supra note 15, at 834 (describing situations 
where “litigation is best situated in each country in which rights are registered”).  
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could not agree on applicable royalty rates for other countries’ patents, the 
parties would be required to bring their claims in the national courts of 
those countries, and no national court would have jurisdiction over the 
worldwide dispute. Of course, the parties would be free to agree on 
alternative dispute resolution procedures, including resolution of the 
global dispute by arbitration or by a specific national court that would 
accept jurisdiction over the global matter. 
These proposed jurisdictional limitations could be implemented 
through the intellectual property policies of standard-setting bodies. As 
noted, courts have held that FRAND commitments made pursuant to such 
intellectual property policies are binding contracts, and that such contracts 
can be enforced by implementers of the relevant technology standard.178 
Currently, the majority of such intellectual property policies do not 
specify a particular forum for dispute resolution. Such policies could be 
modified to include a territorial forum selection clause—providing that, 
absent other agreement, disputes would be resolved by the parties on the 
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis detailed above. 
A. Advantages of Territorial Adjudication 
The jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction resolution of FRAND disputes 
presents clear advantages. First, territorial adjudication makes clear what 
legal background rules apply to FRAND negotiations and licenses in each 
jurisdiction, since no court will have the authority under the FRAND 
commitment to interfere with the patent, contract, and competition 
regimes of other countries. Such clarity can facilitate the FRAND 
negotiation process and the conclusion of agreed licensing arrangements. 
In addition, territorial adjudication ends the jurisdictional competition that 
results in “races to the bottom” or “races to the courthouse.” Since each 
country can only determine FRAND rates for its own patents, no country 
has an incentive to favor either patentees or implementers in order to 
attract FRAND litigation business. Similarly, since no court can impose 
FRAND rates for other countries, neither patentees nor manufacturers 
have an incentive to rush to file suit in any particular jurisdiction in order 
to exploit the favorable FRAND jurisprudence of that country. 
Second, the territorial resolution of FRAND disputes is consistent with 
principles of comity. Jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction litigation means that 
each country will determine the validity and enforceability of its own 
patent rights. In this manner, the authority of each country will not be 
“infringed or limited by another sovereign’s extension of its 
                                                     
178. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.  
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jurisdiction.”179 Moreover, territorial adjudication will reduce the 
frequency of transnational antisuit injunctions. As FRAND litigation in 
any one jurisdiction will not affect royalty rates in other countries, courts 
will have no reason to enjoin foreign litigation in order to preserve their 
own territorially limited jurisdiction. In the words of the Federal Circuit, 
the territorial adjudication of FRAND royalties will not “prejudice the 
rights of . . . foreign governments” to adjudicate their own national patent 
rights.180 As noted above, the meaning of the FRAND commitment cannot 
be divorced from its specific interpretation by any particular national law. 
As such, no court should presume the authority to commandeer resolution 
of the global dispute. 
Third, territorial adjudication would allow jurisdictions to set 
independent FRAND policies appropriate to their specific social, 
economic, and political circumstances.181 Developing countries, for 
example, may advocate for lower royalty levels than developing 
countries. Developing countries have sometimes chafed against what they 
perceive as “onerous” royalties for the use of standardized technology and 
have pressed for lower rates or even royalty-free commitments.182 From 
these countries’ point of view, SEPs are often exploited in order to mine 
exorbitant royalties and exclude competition from developing 
countries.183 On the other hand, allowing developing countries to pay 
lower FRAND rates can facilitate the local availability of technological 
goods, advance the diffusion of technological know-how, and allow firms 
in developing countries to compete with more established companies.184 
                                                     
179. Voda v. Cordis Corp., 476 F.3d 887, 902 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
180. Id. at 901. 
181. See also supra notes 93–99 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of international 
comity and reciprocity in respecting the independent economic and other policies of other 
jurisdictions).  
182. See, e.g., Michael Murphee & Dan Breznitz, Standards, Patents and National 
Competitiveness, GLOB. COMM’N ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE PAPER SERIES, Sept. 30, 2016, at 1, 4 
(describing how China has emphasized technology standards with low or royalty-free rates). Of 
course, the FRAND policies of developed countries may also diverge. See, e.g., Fei Deng et al., 
Comparative Analysis of Court-Determined FRAND Royalty Rates, 32 ANTITRUST 47, 48 (2018) 
(describing the “substantial” differences between the FRAND rates for Ericsson’s patent portfolio in 
the United Kingdom Unwired Planet decision and the United States TCL decision). 
183. KEITH MASKUS, PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC PROBLEMS: THE GLOBAL ECONOMICS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 166 (2012); Xuan Li & Baisheng An, IPR Misuse: 
The Core Issue in Standards and Patents 23 (South Centre Research Papers No. 21, 2009). 
184. Murphee & Breznitz, supra note 182, at 6 (stating that in some circumstances, “the openness 
of technology standards with RAND-based licensing enables firms to make rapid increases in their 
technology capabilities”); see also John Barton, Integrating IPR Policies in Development Strategies, 
in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE 57, 61 (Christophe Bellmann et al. eds., 2003) (observing how strong 
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Indeed, what constitutes a “fair and reasonable” royalty rate in a 
developing country may differ from the appropriate FRAND rate in a 
technologically advanced, developed economy.185 The territorial 
adjudication of FRAND commitments could alleviate some pressure from 
intellectual property policies and royalty rates that are inappropriate for 
local activities.186 
Jurisdictions may also have different preferences for the non-monetary 
aspects of the FRAND commitment. For example, United States courts 
will only in exceptional circumstances issue injunctions against the 
infringement of FRAND-committed patents.187 In contrast, other 
jurisdictions are less restrained in providing injunctive relief.188 Even 
among countries where courts can issue injunctions for the infringement 
of a FRAND-committed patent, individual jurisdictions differ in the 
                                                     
intellectual property protections prevent the growth of competitive technology companies in 
developing countries). 
185. Jorge L. Contreras, National Disparities and Standards Essential Patents: Considerations for 
India, in COMPLICATIONS AND QUANDARIES IN THE ICT SECTOR: STANDARD ESSENTIAL PATENTS 
AND COMPETITION ISSUES 1, 8–9 (Ashish Bharadwaj et al. eds., 2017) (asserting that in developing 
countries “[t]he royalties sought by foreign patent-holding firms, while arguably reasonable on an 
international basis, may be viewed as excessive in local markets”).  
186. Empirically, it does not seem like developing countries have unreasonably devalued FRAND-
committed patents. See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras & Rohini Lakshané, Patents and Mobile Devices in 
India: An Empirical Survey, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 1 (2017) (describing how FRAND 
litigation in India has “largely resulted in judgments favoring foreign patent holders”); Erick S. 
Robertson, Highest Court in China Overturns Ridiculously Low Royalty in Interdigital v. Huawei, 
CHINA PAT. BLOG (Dec. 28, 2018), https://www.chinapatentblog.com/blog/highest-court-in-china-
overturns-ridiculously-low-royalty-in-interdigital-v-huawei [https://perma.cc/B5T5-28U3].  
187. J. Gregory Sidak, Injunctive Relief and the FRAND Commitment in The United States, in 1 
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: ANTITRUST AND PATENTS 389 
(Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2018) (noting that “in the United States, it is exceptional for an SEP holder 
to obtain either an injunction or an exclusion order against an infringer of SEPs”). Academic 
commentary has also presented divergent views about the proprietary of injunctions in the FRAND 
context. Compare Joseph Miller, Standard-Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-in: RAND Licensing 
and the Theory of the Firm, 40 IND. L. REV. 351, 358 (2007) (asserting that “the core meaning of the 
RAND promise [is] an irrevocable waiver of injunctive relief”), with Damien Geradin & Miguel Rato, 
Can Standard-Setting Lead to Exploitative Abuse: A Dissonant View on Patent Hold-Up, Royalty 
Stacking and the Meaning of FRAND, 3 EUR. COMPETITION J. 101, 118–19 (2007) (arguing that a 
FRAND commitment “cannot be interpreted as an implicit waiver to its right to seek injunctive 
relief”). 
188. See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Comparative Law and Economics of Standard Essential Patents 
and FRAND Royalties, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 311, 325 (2014) [hereinafter Cotter, Comparative 
Law & Economics] (detailing the grant of an injunction against the infringement of standard-essential 
patent in South Korea); Thomas F. Cotter, Shenzhen Court Enters Injunction Against Samsung for 
Infringement of Huawei SEPs, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES (Jan. 11, 2018), 
http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/2018/01/shenzhen-court-enters-injunction.html 
[https://perma.cc/A7SS-REB4] (describing two injunctions issued in Chinese courts); Hermann, 
supra note 111, at 589 (noting that patentees continue to seek injunctions in Germany).  
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specific standards that must be met in order to grant such non-monetary 
remedies.189 The availability of injunctions has important consequences 
for the cost of technology and the structure of local markets,190 and the 
diversity of international attitudes to FRAND injunctions reflects a broad 
range of policy positions regarding these consequences. But one court’s 
assertion of authority over a global FRAND dispute effectively cuts off 
that debate for all other jurisdictions worldwide. For example, the 
Unwired Planet decision to impose a global FRAND license meant that 
Huawei’s activities would be licensed worldwide—and neither would 
Unwired Planet seek nor would Huawei oppose an injunction for the 
infringement of those standard-essential patents in any other jurisdiction. 
Similarly, the United States decisions in both Microsoft and Huawei 
precluded the enforcement of injunctions issued in Germany and China. 
In all of these cases, the courts of one jurisdiction prevented other 
countries from implementing their own domestic choices regarding 
FRAND policy. By contrast, jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction adjudication of 
these remedies would allow each country the flexibility to determine its 
own terms of access to standardized technology. 
Such territorial flexibility dovetails with the current structure of 
international intellectual property law. The international Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) requires 
countries to implement a relatively high common baseline of intellectual 
property protection.191 At the same time, individual jurisdictions may 
adjust that framework to their own domestic preferences and rate of 
development.192 For example, with respect to remedies, while TRIPS 
                                                     
189. See generally Cotter, Comparative Law & Economics, at 322–27 (describing the availability 
of injunctions in Europe and Asia); Larouche & Zingales, supra note 3, at 419 (noting that “even in 
an integrated region like the EU” the standards regarding the issuance of injunctions differ across 
jurisdictions, “resulting in a patchwork of remedies”). 
190. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and 
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1296 (1996) (asserting that injunctions can 
“drive IPR holders in high transaction industries into repeat-play bargaining” and the establishment 
of institutional structures to facilitate such bargaining); see generally Mark A. Lemley, Contracting 
Around Liability Rules, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 463 (2012) (discussing the effects of liability or property 
rules for intellectual property). 
191. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C, Apr. 15, 
1994, 33 I.L.M. 81, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf [https://perma.cc/32ZP-
4YDY]. 
192. See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichmann & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harmonization Without 
Consensus: Critical Reflections on Drafting a Substantive Patent Law Treaty, 57 DUKE L.J. 85, 98 
(2007) (asserting that flexibility under TRIPS “allow[s] developing countries considerable policy 
space in which to maximize the benefits and minimize the social costs of adopting the international 
minimum standards”); see generally Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case 
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requires that national courts have the authority to impose “damages 
adequate to compensate” for infringement, TRIPS does not define what 
magnitude of damages would be considered “adequate.”193 Similarly, 
while TRIPS demands that courts be able to issue injunctions against 
infringement, the agreement does not dictate the standards under which 
an injunction should issue.194 As such, territorial adjudication of FRAND 
patent remedies is consistent with the freedom and flexibility granted to 
countries under the TRIPS agreement. Indeed, the freedom of each 
jurisdiction to set its own national intellectual property policies under 
TRIPS should be comparatively greater in the FRAND context, where 
remedies depend not only on patent law, but also on the contractual 
interpretation of the voluntary FRAND commitment and domestic 
requirements of competition law.195 
In sum, territorial adjudication of FRAND disputes presents systemic 
advantages. Territorial adjudication provides legal clarity, facilitates 
licensing negotiations, promotes international comity, and allows each 
jurisdiction to resolve the dispute according to its own economic needs 
and social and political values.196 Achieving these systemic advantages, 
however, risks imposing concrete and immediate costs, both on the 
individual litigants and on the judicial systems tasked with resolving the 
disputes. The following section details the costs of territorial adjudication 
but also argues that such costs are unavoidable. Rather than pretending 
that such costs can be ducked, standards communities should aim at 
minimizing such costs through substantive and procedural mechanisms. 
                                                     
Study of TRIPS Implementation in India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1571 (2009) 
(describing how India has adapted TRIPS requirements to its own domestic policy preferences).  
193. TRIPS, supra note 191, art. 45.1; see also John Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global 
Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 706 (2002) (noting that even as TRIPs harmonizes 
international patent law, it does not “mandate any particular price for an innovation”); Kapczynksi, 
supra note 192, at 1610. 
194. TRIPS, supra note 191, art. 44.1; see generally Kapczynksi, supra note 192, at 1607.  
195. TRIPS, supra note 191, art. 40.2 (providing that the TRIPS agreement does not “prevent 
Members from specifying in their legislation licensing practices or conditions that may in particular 
cases constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the 
relevant market”). Individual countries may also see standards-related disputes as implicating issues 
of national security. See generally Eli Greenbaum, 5G, Standard-Setting, and National Security, 
HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. (July 3, 2018), http://harvardnsj.org/2018/07/5g-standard-setting-and-national-
security/ [https://perma.cc/NG27-LKE8]. Such concerns may potentially have relevance under 
TRIPS. See TRIPS, supra note 191, art. 73. 
196. The inclusion of a territorial forum-selection clause in a contractual FRAND commitment 
cannot prevent national competition law agencies from imposing remedies that affect both domestic 
and foreign patents rights. Nonetheless, the insistence by a standard-setting body on the territorial 
adjudication of FRAND royalty rates may serve as a cue to regulatory agencies regarding the 
normative limits of their jurisdiction.  
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B. The Inevitability of Territorial Adjudication 
Courts and commentators have resisted the territorial resolution of 
FRAND disputes.197 Indeed, adjudication on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction 
basis can greatly increase the cost of dispute resolution. Instead of a single 
proceeding that resolves the global dispute, the parties may be forced to 
slog through duplicative country-by-country litigation.198 For patentees, 
the weight of the multiple lawsuits necessary to enforce global patent 
rights could hold down the value of those rights.199 For implementers, the 
heavy expenses associated with defending against worldwide litigation 
could strain company resources and delay or even preclude entry into 
important markets.200 For the public, duplicative lawsuits across 
jurisdictions strain judicial resources, which could be economized by 
aggregating related cases in a single jurisdiction. Indeed, this Article does 
not argue that territorial adjudication of FRAND litigation presents the 
most efficient means of dispute resolution.201 Rather, this Article 
                                                     
197. For court decisions that have opposed territorial adjudication, see supra text accompanying 
notes 57–75. For commentators that have opposed territorial adjudication, see, for example, 
Contreras, supra note 16, at 709 (noting the costs of “duplicative negotiation and litigation . . . among 
the same parties litigating in different jurisdictions”). 
198. Contreras, supra note 16, at 709.  
199. The Court of Appeals in Unwired Planet, in justifying a worldwide license, focused on these 
costs to the patentee. See Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co. [2018] E.W.C.A. (Civ) 2344 
p. 88, (Eng.) (Requiring Unwired Planet to bring actions in each jurisdiction worldwide would “be a 
blue print for hold-out . . . [T]he costs of such litigation for [Unwired Planet] would be prohibitively 
high. So the outcome would be that . . . [Unwired Planet] would not be able to secure payment of 
royalties for those jurisdictions in which it could not afford to bring proceedings.”). It is not clear, 
however, why the Court of Appeals considered only the patentees’ litigation costs but not the converse 
costs that a worldwide license imposes on the implementer—a worldwide license requires the 
implementer to commence royalty payments under the worldwide license but challenge the patents 
on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction basis. Moreover, the question of how to deter opportunistic hold-out 
by implementers is often addressed by individual jurisdictions in deciding whether to impose 
supracompensatory awards for patent infringement. See generally Colleen V. Chien et al., Enhanced 
Damages, Litigation Cost Recovery, and Interest, in PATENT REMEDIES AND COMPLEX PRODUCTS: 
TOWARD A GLOBAL CONSENSUS 158 (forthcoming) (Brad Biddle et al. eds., 2019) (comparing 
enhanced damages for patent infringement across jurisdictions). The question of whether to impose 
such supracompensatory damages may be better left to individual jurisdictions to determine based 
upon their own domestic policy choices.  
200. Dreyfuss, supra note 15, at 825 (“[R]ights holders can use the necessity of successive actions 
to their advantage, to wear users down by bringing actions seriatim . . . . This is a particular problem 
for small businesses that lack the legal and technical sophistication . . . and the resources to fight 
multiple suits”).  
201. At the same time, this author is skeptical of claims that territorial adjudication will result in a 
war of attrition as the parties grind their dispute through the courts of each jurisdiction worldwide. A 
more likely consequence of requiring territorial adjudication is that the parties will litigate a FRAND 
dispute in major markets, and then by settlement extend analogous royalty rates to other jurisdictions 
less central to their business. Cf. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 177, § 221, Rep. n.4 (suggesting that 
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demonstrates the futility of efforts to restrain a tenacious FRAND litigant 
from pursuing jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction litigation and argues instead for 
the incorporation of cost saving rules and procedures into the FRAND 
commitment. 
First, the pronouncement by one court that it will impose a global 
FRAND resolution comes with no guarantee that other courts and 
government regulatory agencies will not make similar assertions of 
jurisdiction. As such, no court can provide assurance that its own 
assumption of jurisdiction will hold down costs by precluding litigation 
in other forums. Indeed, since FRAND commitments typically do not 
include a forum-selection clause, the commitment’s language provides no 
reason to prefer one jurisdiction over another.202 Both the Microsoft and 
Unwired Planet courts pointed to the FRAND commitment’s global 
character in order to justify their own authority to resolve the 
multinational dispute.203 Any other court and government agency could 
make similar claims. 
Second, even when courts have asserted jurisdiction to resolve a global 
dispute, they have themselves acknowledged that the litigants retain rights 
to pursue related litigation in national courts. For example, implementers 
have retained the right to challenge patent validity, essentiality, and 
infringement in other forums.204 The Unwired Planet court allowed that, 
even following the court’s global rate determination, Huawei still retained 
the rights to challenge the validity of each patent in its issuing 
jurisdiction.205 Indeed, the court expressly allowed that its judicially set 
global FRAND rates would be adjusted annually based on continuing 
                                                     
“multinational litigation often ends when the plaintiff wins an action in the defendant’s largest 
market”).  
202. See supra text accompanying note 87. 
203. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 884 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that “the face of 
the [FRAND commitment] contract makes clear that it encompasses not just U.S. patents, but all of 
Motorola’s standard-essential patents worldwide”); Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co. 
[2018] E.W.C.A. (Civ) 2344 p. 80 (Eng.) (holding that Unwired Planet’s FRAND commitment is a 
“single undertaking”). 
204. See Dinwoodie, supra note 15, at 745–46 (the costs of “satellite” litigation regarding patent 
validity should be “figured into the calculation of efficiency gains that are claimed for consolidation” 
of multinational patent disputes in general). 
205. Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co. [2017] E.W.H.C. 711 p. 567 (Eng.). In Unwired 
Planet, there were ongoing invalidity proceedings in Germany and China, which were not halted by 
the United Kingdom FRAND decision. Id. at 570. Indeed, under regulations of the European Union, 
the English court did not have jurisdiction to pronounce on the validity of non-English patents. Id. at 
566–67. See generally Trimble, supra note 15, at 518 (noting that under European regulations, only 
“the courts and administrative bodies of the country in which a patent was granted may decide the 
validity of the patent”).  
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developments in the “patent landscape.”206 In other words, despite 
Unwired Planet’s insistence that imposing worldwide FRAND rates was 
necessary to avoid country-by-country litigation, the decision itself 
acknowledged that such drawn-out litigation may nonetheless ensue.207 
The recent FRAND-related case of Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm Inc.208 
demonstrates the similar reluctance of United States courts to prevent 
foreign courts from adjudicating the validity of foreign patents. In that 
case, the parties generally disputed whether Qualcomm had satisfied its 
FRAND commitment. Apple brought contract, patent, and competition 
law claims against Qualcomm in the United States, as well as the United 
Kingdom, Japan, China, and Taiwan.209 Apple’s foreign claims included 
challenges to the validity and essentiality of Qualcomm’s foreign 
patents.210 In response, among other claims, Qualcomm requested the 
court to either confirm that Qualcomm satisfied its FRAND commitment, 
or, alternatively, to set global FRAND rates.211 Qualcomm then asked the 
United States district court to enjoin Apple’s pursuit of its foreign claims, 
asserting that all of Apple’s foreign claims were related to—and would be 
resolved by—a United States decision concerning a global FRAND 
license. The court, however, refused to enjoin the foreign claims, stating 
that it “cannot adjudicate or enforce the patent law of the U.K., China, 
Japan or Taiwan.”212 Altogether, Apple remained free to pursue its foreign 
patent law claims notwithstanding Qualcomm’s claims for the 
determination of a global FRAND royalty rate.213 
Claims regarding the breach of a contractual FRAND commitment 
often go hand-in-hand with antitrust-related claims. As with patent claims, 
an implementer that is a dogged litigant may continue to pursue such 
                                                     
206. Unwired Planet. [2018] E.W.C.A. (Civ) p. 89(iv), [2018] AC p. 89(iv). 
207. See also Microsoft., 696 F.3d at 888 (upholding anti-suit injunction since it does not bar 
pursuit of German patent claims); Huawei Techs. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 3:16-cv-02787-
WHO, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63052, at *40 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2018) (clarifying that injunction is 
limited to the enforcement of Chinese injunctions). But see TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings v. 
Telefonaktienbolaget LM Ericsson, No. 8:14-cv-00341-JVS-AN, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191512, at 
*19 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2015) (enjoining all foreign litigation concerning counterpart patents, 
including regarding validity). The TCL parties, however, consented to the broad scope of the 
injunction.  
208. No. 3:17-cv-00108-GPC-MDD, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145835 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2017).  
209. Id. at *13–16 (describing Apple’s claims under foreign law in foreign jurisdictions).  
210. Id.  
211. Id. at *12. 
212. Id. at *43.  
213. See also Conversant Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2018] E.W.H.C. 808 
p. 18 (Eng.) (discussing a United Kingdom suit to set global FRAND rates where defendants Huawei 
and ZTE remained free to challenge the validity of Chinese patents in Chinese courts). 
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antitrust claims through multiple forums even following a global rate 
determination. For example, in Apple Inc. v. Qualcomm, Apple had also 
advanced competition-related claims in a number of foreign 
jurisdictions.214 The United States district court also refused to enjoin 
those claims, reasoning that “even resolution of Qualcomm’s global 
contractual [FRAND] obligations” would not “dispose of Apple’s 
anticompetitive claims abroad.”215 Moreover, according to the court, 
“Apple had a legitimate reason” to separately pursue the foreign 
competition law claims since “antitrust laws differ significantly from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction.”216 Each of the foreign sovereigns also had a 
separate interest in examining potential anti-competitive effects in their 
territory. As such, a ruling to enjoin the foreign competition law claims 
would interfere with comity and “deprive” those countries of their 
jurisdiction to scrutinize domestic competition law matters.217 
Persistent patentees can also force jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction 
litigation. Even if proceedings to set a global FRAND rate continue in one 
jurisdiction, a patentee that holds foreign counterpart patents will 
ordinarily still be able to advance infringement claims in those foreign 
jurisdictions. For example, in both Microsoft v. Motorola and Huawei v. 
Samsung, the patentee filed suit in the United States as well as in foreign 
jurisdictions.218 In both cases, the foreign case progressed faster than the 
corresponding United States litigation, with the foreign court issuing an 
injunction against further infringement in the foreign jurisdiction.219 
Though in both cases the United States court prohibited patentees 
(Motorola and Huawei, respectively) from enforcing the foreign 
injunctive relief, the courts otherwise allowed the foreign case to continue 
in parallel. In other words, both Motorola and Huawei were permitted to 
                                                     
214. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145835, at *13–16. 
215. Id. at *36.  
216. Id. at *41–42 
217. Id. at *56. Cf. Vringo, Inc. v. ZTE Corp., No. 14-cv-4988, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71919, at 
*34–36 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2015) (stating that contract-related claims regarding the unauthorized 
disclosure of proposed FRAND rates would not be dispositive of Chinese competition-law claims). 
But see Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co., [2017] E.W.H.C. 2831 p. 3 (Eng.) (noting a 
readiness to enjoin Chinese competition law claims related to the UK court’s determination for global 
FRAND rates). However, the Chinese proceedings at issue in Unwired Planet were only commenced 
subsequent to the decision of the UK court. This may have increased the possibility that the latter saw 
the Chinese proceedings as interfering with its “jurisdiction, judgment and processes.” Id. 
218. See Microsoft v. Motorola, 696 F.3d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing related litigation in 
Germany by General Instruments Corporation, part of the Motorola Group); Huawei Techs. Co. v. 
Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 3:16-cv-02787-WHO, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63052, at *11–12 (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 13, 2018) (describing related litigation in China).  
219. Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 879; Huawei, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63052, at *12.  
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continue pursuing foreign infringement claims and related demands for 
damages (but not injunctions) in the foreign jurisdiction. The Ninth 
Circuit expressly noted that the injunction against Motorola prohibited 
enforcement of the foreign injunction, but otherwise left Motorola “free 
to continue litigating . . . as to damages or other non-injunctive 
remedies.”220 Similarly, the Huawei court noted that its order only 
enjoined “Huawei from enforcing the Chinese injunctions” and was 
limited to that “specific form of relief.”221 In other words, the assertion of 
one court that it has authority to adjudicate a global FRAND dispute has 
not stopped patentees from continuing to litigate infringement of the same 
patents in foreign jurisdictions.222 
Moreover, even if a court resolutely brings peace to a global FRAND 
dispute, a patentee unhappy with the terms of the truce’ may nonetheless 
persevere with related non-FRAND hostilities. Patentees with rich 
worldwide FRAND portfolios typically also hold patents that are not 
subject to any such FRAND obligations.223 Such non-FRAND patents 
may cover complementary technologies that, while not essential to 
implementation of a standard, remain of significant commercial import.224 
FRAND disputes often feature such non-FRAND patents in a supporting 
role. For example, in Huawei v. Samsung, in addition to bringing SEP 
infringement claims in United States court, Huawei also brought suit in 
China for the infringement of thirteen SEPs and an additional seven non-
SEPs.225 The Unwired Planet case also included infringement claims for 
                                                     
220. Microsoft, 696 F.3d at 889. 
221. Huawei, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63052, at *40. 
222. See also TQ Delta LLC v. ZyXEL Commc’ns Inc., No. 1:13-cv-02013-RGA, 2018 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 98228, at *10 (D. Del. June 12, 2018) (allowing litigation for the infringement of FRAND-
committed patents to proceed in parallel in the United States and the United Kingdom).  
223. Anne Layne-Farrar, Moving Past The SEP Rand Obsession: Some Thoughts on the Economic 
Implications of Unilateral Commitments and the Complexities of Patent Licensing, 21 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 1093, 1101–02 (2014) (“[T]he typical firm participating in a [standard-setting organization] 
holds more than just SEPs within its patent portfolio. Some of these non-SEP patents might play a 
supporting role to SEPs . . . they might cover differentiating technologies that enable their holder to 
compete more effectively in downstream markets”). 
224. Id. 
225. Jacob Schindler, How Samsung and Huawei have Fared in 42 Chinese Patent Cases Against Each 
Other So Far, IAM (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.iam-media.com/frandseps/how-samsung-and-huawei-
have-fared-42-chinese-patent-cases-against-each-other-so-far [https://perma.cc/R37G-NBW6]; see also 
Huawei, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63052, at *12 n.7 (“The parties filed a total of 42 infringement actions in 
China, one corresponding to each patent, both SEP and non-SEP.”). The antisuit injunction issued by the 
United States district court was only in regards to Samsung’s SEPs. Id. at *12–13.  
 
09 - Greenbaum.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/1/2019  3:28 PM 
2019] NO FORUM TO RULE THEM ALL 1129 
 
a non-SEP.226 In TCL, the patentee Ericsson sued for infringement of SEPs 
in six foreign jurisdictions, as well as suing for infringement of different, 
non-essential patents in another United States jurisdiction. The TCL court 
enjoined pursuit of the foreign actions, but allowed Ericsson to continue 
to pursue the non-SEP litigation, reasoning that the court had “no basis to 
prevent Ericsson from pursuing infringement claims that will not be 
resolved by the present FRAND litigation.”227 In other words, non-SEPs 
are not ordinarily subject to any contractual licensing commitment. While 
a court may be prepared to consolidate worldwide FRAND litigation in 
order to bring resolution to the FRAND dispute, there will ordinarily be 
no contractual predicate for bringing foreign non-SEPs under the court’s 
jurisdiction. As such, even a global FRAND determination may not 
necessarily bring a cessation of litigation.228 
The ability of determined patentees and implementers to compel 
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction litigation, while perhaps undermining the 
efficient consolidation of FRAND disputes into a single forum, rises from 
the international system’s foundations. In the words of the eminent 
international jurist Vaughan Lowe, “[t]he legal rules and principles 
governing jurisdiction have a fundamental importance in international 
relations, because they are concerned with the allocation between 
States . . . [of] the competence to secure the differences that make each 
State a distinct society.”229 Each country develops its own patent and 
competition policy from its understanding of the policies appropriate to 
its own economic, social, and cultural circumstances. FRAND disputes in 
particular implicate a broad range of potentially significant economic 
policy decisions for each sovereign, from the efficient encouragement of 
domestic innovation, the need for broad access to advanced technology, 
and the economic struggle between foreign and domestic commercial 
actors. In this light, it is not surprising that each jurisdiction jealously 
guards the authority to decide the invalidity and scope of its own domestic 
patents and the reach of its own competition law. As such, even if one 
court attempts to impose its own interpretation of FRAND royalties, and 
                                                     
226. Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co. [2017] E.W.H.C. 711 p. 2 (Eng.). The licensing 
agreement determined by the English court in Unwired Planet did not include rights to Unwired Planet’s non-
standard-essential patents. See Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co. [2017] E.W.H.C. 1304 (Eng.). 
227. TCL Commc’n, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191512, at *15.  
228. See also Qualcomm FTC Comments, supra note 172, at 17 (claiming that “the large majority 
of patents being asserted . . . are not even claimed to be essential,” and parties could “[u]se the 
leverage gained from actual or threatened non-essential-patent-based injunctions to force a 
renegotiation of the SEP-only license”). 
229. Vaughan Lowe, Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 335 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2d ed. 
2006) (emphasis omitted). 
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even if that monetary decision is respected by other jurisdictions, those 
other jurisdictions may subsequently demand their own say on related 
issues of domestic importance. 
C. How to Reduce the Costs of Territorial Adjudication 
Jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction litigation imposes heavy costs, but the 
FRAND commitment provides a ready foundation for contractual 
mechanisms that can ease that burden. Outside of the FRAND context, 
some commentators have suggested that multinational patent litigation 
could be simplified through cross-border cooperation and coordination.230 
The non-FRAND context, however, presents non-trivial barriers to the 
adoption of such processes, since cross-border implementation could 
require an international agreement or formal treaty.231 In contrast, 
FRAND disputes march forward under the discipline of the FRAND 
commitment, and that contractual commitment could also include 
substantive and procedural frameworks for international cooperation and 
coordination. Again, such mechanisms would not prevent parties from 
agreeing on alternative means of dispute resolution. A failure to agree on 
such alternative arrangements, however, would trigger the default 
framework of territorial litigation that this Article advocates, 
accompanied by supporting mechanisms aimed at reducing the costs and 
expenses of dispute resolution. 
On a substantive level, the FRAND commitment could provide that 
factual determinations made in FRAND litigation by the judicial 
authorities of one jurisdiction should be presumptively adopted in 
subsequent litigation, including by foreign tribunals in subsequent 
proceedings.232 Such an agreement would allow both United States and 
                                                     
230. See, e.g., ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 177, at pt. II Introductory Note (recommending 
principles for transnational patent adjudication, and noting that the suggested principles “aim to create 
efficiency through coordinated adjudication”); James Pooley & Vicki Huang, Multi-National Patent 
Litigation: Management of Discovery and Settlement Issues and the Role of the Judiciary, 22 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 45, 47 (2011) (offering suggestions for improving “the 
efficient management of multinational patent disputes”); see generally Dreyfuss, supra note 15 
(commenting on the ALI Principles).  
231. See, e.g., Begley, supra note 15, at 569 (recommending the establishment of a “multinational 
organization, established by treaty, creating a global patent that is respected in all member states and 
enforced by an international patent court,” but also recognizing the obstacles to creating such a 
system); Dreyfuss, supra note 15, at 826 (noting the limited advantages of the ALI Principles, since 
“the drafters do not represent states”); Pooley & Huang, supra note 230, at 56 (describing the 
constraints of obtaining cross-border discovery under existing international arrangements). 
232. See also ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 177, § 222 Rep. n.1 (proposing that multi-jurisdictional 
patent litigation may be streamlined by parties agreeing to be “bound by a single court’s factual 
determinations”). 
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foreign courts to rely on the determinations of other decisionmaking 
bodies, thus reducing the need for extensive discovery and duplicative 
litigation to repeatedly “prove” the same facts. Such an agreement need 
not completely prohibit the reexamination of factual determinations in 
other jurisdictions. Rather, the FRAND commitment could employ a more 
flexible arrangement—for example, requiring the acceptance of foreign 
factual findings, except to the extent that those factual findings emerge 
from factors specific to the foreign legal framework.233 
An agreement to employ the fact-finding of foreign tribunals can be 
enforceable in United States courts. Admittedly, the Federal Circuit has 
held that foreign patent law decisions cannot be used to preclude litigation 
of the same legal issues in the United States.234 However, a number of 
subsequent decisions have limited Federal Circuit’s holding and 
welcomed the admission of foreign factual determinations in certain 
circumstances.235 For example, some courts permit the adoption of factual 
findings made in foreign patent litigation if the parties have agreed to the 
preclusive effect of such factual determinations.236 The FRAND 
commitment could provide firm contractual foundations for such an 
agreement, and allow United States courts to adopt the factual findings of 
FRAND royalty determinations made in other jurisdictions. 
Even in the absence of an agreement, some United States courts have 
allowed the importation of foreign determinations so long as the court sifts 
through the foreign judgments to exclude legal conclusions. For example, 
in Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar,237 a district court held that it could adopt 
the factual findings of a Canadian court regarding the validity of a 
                                                     
233. For example, if a court determines that a specific agreement provides a comparable license 
that can aid in the calculation of patent royalties, subsequent litigation may challenge that factual 
determination to the extent that the subsequent jurisdiction take a substantially different approach as 
to what constitutes a “comparable” license.  
234. See, e.g., Medtronic Inc. v. Daig Corp., 789 F.2d 903, 907–08 (Fed Cir. 1986), cert. denied 
479 U.S. 931 (1986) (rejecting an argument that the court should adopt a German judgment that a 
German counterpart patent was obvious, stating that “[t]his argument is specious,” and “[t]he patent 
laws of the United States are the laws governing a determination of obviousness/nonobviousness of a 
United States patent in a federal court”); see also Cuno, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 729 F. Supp. 234, 238–39 
(E.D.N.Y. 1989) (listing cases to show that the Federal Circuit has shown a “general antipathy to 
applying collateral estoppel” in order to adopt the findings of foreign courts). 
235. See infra notes 236–239 and accompanying text. 
236. Oneac Corp. v. Raychem Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1233, 1243 (N.D. Ill. 1998); see also Merck 
& Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 288 F. Supp. 2d 601, 611 (D. Del. 2003) (refusing to adopt the 
findings of a British court concerning “mixed questions of law and fact”, and distinguishing Oneac 
since the parties in that case “agreed to be bound by such factual findings”).  
237. 745 F. Supp. 517, 526 (N.D. Ill. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 935 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 
1991). 
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Canadian patent, after ensuring that those “findings are free of the 
influence of legal differences.”238 The court endorsed the efficiency of this 
approach, asserting that a contrary rule would turn international patent 
litigation into a “war of attrition, in which after the conclusion of one 
battle parties move on to another and duplicate the engagement.”239 
Even when United States courts have resisted the adoption of foreign 
patent findings, that has generally meant opposition to the acceptance of 
determinations related to the validity or infringement of foreign patents.240 
Indeed, as discussed above, matters of patent validity are often intertwined 
tightly with the legal and policy frameworks of individual jurisdictions. 
FRAND battles, however, see the parties clash over a legion of details in 
a fundamentally economic analysis of patent value. These details can 
include, for example, the total economic value that a standard contributes 
to a product241 and the proportional share of that total value attributable to 
the patents owned by the litigants.242 This latter determination, in 
particular, can combine the methodical counting of the owned patents 
with a specialized, technical evaluation of patent strength243—neither of 
which are likely to involve findings that are closely related to the legal 
framework of any particular jurisdiction.244 FRAND royalty 
                                                     
238. Id. 
239. Id. at 525.  
240. Medtronic Inc. v. Daig Corp., 789 F.2d 903, 907 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (rejecting the adoption of a 
German ruling finding a patent obvious); Merck, 288 F. Supp. At 611 (denying preclusive effect to 
the obviousness decision of a U.K. court); Cuno Inc. v. Pall Corp., 729 F. Supp. 234, 234 (E.D.N.Y. 
1989) (denying preclusive effect to validity and infringement decisions of a U.K. court).  
241. TCL Commc’n Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, No. CV 15-2370 
JVS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214003, at *47 (using patentee’s public statements and press releases to 
determine an aggregate royalty burden for use of the standard); Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei 
Tech. Co. [2017] E.W.H.C. 711 p. 264 (Eng.) (same); cf. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC. No. 11 C 
9308, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061, at *176–77 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2013) (determining profit margin 
on a WiFi chip, in order to determine the aggregate royalty burden for use of the standard).  
242. TCL Commc’n, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214003, at *30–31 (describing methodology for the 
calculation of FRAND rates); Innovatio, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061, at *180–81 (determining 
strength of applicable standard-essential patents); Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co. 
[2017] E.W.H.C. 711 p. 178 (Eng.) (same). 
243. TCL Commc’n, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214003, at *47 (patent counting in a FRAND royalty 
analysis); Innovatio, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144061, at *177 (assessing the number of patents 
essential to the standard); Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 60233, at *269 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013) (patent counting in order to extract a comparable 
valuation from a patent pool); Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Tech. Co. [2017] E.W.H.C. 711 
p. 198 (Eng.) (counting Unwired Planet’s patents to determine its share of a larger patent portfolio); 
id. at 273 (patent counting in a FRAND royalty analysis). 
244. But see TCL Commc’n, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214003, at *65 (patent counting methodology 
does not include expired patents, as required by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in 
 
09 - Greenbaum.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/1/2019  3:28 PM 
2019] NO FORUM TO RULE THEM ALL 1133 
 
determinations may also involve the “unpacking” of potentially 
comparable license agreements—the economic analysis of all the varied 
terms of those licenses to derive a single royalty rate that can be used for 
comparison purposes.245 Again, “unpacking” typically involves a 
technical economic analysis that does not hinge on the underpinnings of 
any specific legal culture. Adopted factual findings could potentially also 
include details of the parties’ (failed) negotiations towards FRAND 
rates,246 which may be relevant to deciding whether the parties bargained 
in compliance with the FRAND commitment.247 
The FRAND commitment could also include procedural mechanisms 
for easing the burden of jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction litigation. For 
example, the ALI has proposed that multi-jurisdictional patent litigation 
could be streamlined by encouraging litigants to coordinate the scope of 
their dispute and associated discovery across jurisdictions.248 Such 
coordination could be effected through global mediation or case 
management conferences to discuss discovery and possible settlement 
options on a worldwide basis.249 Similarly, direct communication between 
the various national courts handling a global FRAND litigation could 
assist in identifying means of sharing resources and agreeing on efficient 
cross-border procedures.250 In general, outside of the FRAND context, 
implementing the ALI recommendations could require an international 
agreement on common procedures for the resolution of transnational 
                                                     
Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964)). Courts in other jurisdictions may come to different 
conclusions regarding counting expired patents.  
245. Id. at *95 (describing the process of unpacking licenses); see also Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. 
v. Huawei Tech. Co. [2017] E.W.H.C. 711 pp. 187–90 (Eng.) (same); Microsoft, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 60233, at *246 (providing a monetary value for access to technology provided through the 
MPEG-LA patent pool). 
246. TCL Commc’n, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214003, at *9 (reviewing the history of the parties’ 
FRAND negotiation) 
247. An agreement to apply prior judicial factual findings would also need to address how that 
agreement will apply to parties that are affiliated with the original litigants but not actual parties to 
the first litigation.  
248. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 177, § 222 Rep. note 1 (proposing that “substantial benefits could 
be achieved if, before any trial commences, the parties agree to take the inventor’s testimony a single 
time, choose to focus their disputes on the same embodiments of the accused device, and stipulate to 
the documents and practices that constitute the prior art”).  
249. Pooley & Huang, supra note 230, at 64 (proposing cross-jurisdictional procedures for 
streamlining multinational patent litigation). 
250. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 177, § 222 Rep. note 1 (describing potential “[j]udicial 
cooperation”); see also Pooley & Huang, supra note 230, at 66 (recommending formal and informal 
communication between judges); Cf. Jay L. Westbrook, International Judicial Negotiation, 38 TEX. 
INT’L L.J. 567, 580 (2003) (advocating for direct judicial communication to coordinate transnational 
insolvency proceedings). 
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patent disputes.251 Many of those recommendations, however, could be 
incorporated into the FRAND contractual commitment, which could 
provide an agreed procedural framework for the efficient resolution of 
transnational disputes.252 
To date, the paucity of formal arrangements for coordinating 
international patent litigation means that courts have little experience with 
such means of cooperation.253 As such, it is difficult to predict what 
mechanisms could provide substantive support for the facilitation of 
international judicial communication and coordination. At the same time, 
a FRAND contractual commitment that requires common procedural 
mechanisms for streamlining global litigation could provide courts with 
much-needed experience in transnational coordination. As such, the 
intellectual property policies of standard-setting organizations could 
provide fertile ground for studying such cross-border mechanisms and 
eventually expanding such procedures to other areas of intellectual 
property law. 
CONCLUSION 
Commentators and regulators have sometimes recommended the 
inclusion of more substantive rules in the FRAND commitment.254 The 
intellectual property policies of most standard-setting organizations are 
light on detailing the meaning of FRAND, and such recommendations aim 
at providing FRAND requirements with more explanatory heft.255 Such 
recommendations have included, for example, clearly restricting the right 
of a FRAND-committed patentee to obtain injunctive relief, as well as 
rules and procedures to assist in calculating a FRAND royalty rate.256 
Indeed, following these calls, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
                                                     
251. Dreyfuss, supra note 15, at 826 (noting the limited utility of the ALI Principles in the absence 
of an international agreement).  
252. Id. (noting that certain of the ALI Principles could “[be] adopted through the consent of the 
parties”). 
253. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 177, § 223 Rep. note (noting that there is “insufficient experience 
with coordination to build upon” in creating cooperative procedures).  
254. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things To Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (And One 
Not To), 48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 161 (2007); Kai-Uwe Kühn et al., Standard Setting Organizations Can 
Help Solve the Standard Essential Patents Licensing Problem, 3 ANTITRUST CHRON. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 
1, 4 (2013), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Free/ScottMortonetalMar-
13Special.pdf [https://perma.cc/52HP-DUAS]; Renata Hesse, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust 
Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, SIX “SMALL” PROPOSALS FOR SSOS BEFORE LUNCH 9 (Oct. 10, 2012) 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518951/download [https://perma.cc/MR4V-2GAV]. 
255. See, e.g., Kilhn et al., supra note 254, at 4; Hesse, supra note 254, at 9–10. 
256. See Kilhn et al., supra note 254, at 4. 
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Engineers Standards Association (“IEEE-SA”) substantially revised its 
own patent policy to clarify the FRAND obligation.257 
This Article has proposed that, in the absence of an agreement to the 
contrary, FRAND obligations should be interpreted by national courts. In 
other words, in contrast to some prior suggestions for clarifying the 
policies of standard-setting organizations, this Article does not offer 
substantive modifications to FRAND rules but rather proposes including 
a jurisdictional standard for determining which court should be entrusted 
with explicating such rules. Nevertheless, the crucial interpretive 
commentary provided by national courts should not obviate the role of 
standard-setting organizations. Courts can only provide their reading of 
the specific language of the FRAND commitment before them.258 In 
contrast, standard-setting organizations can, at least within the confines of 
mandatory patent and antitrust law, adapt the language of the FRAND 
commitment in response to these court decisions and market 
requirements.259 
The approach advocated by this Article should result in a collection of 
public case law interpreting the parties’ rights and obligations under the 
FRAND commitment in varied legal regimes and circumstances. Indeed, 
recent court decisions have provided much-needed clarity to certain 
aspects of FRAND and the rights and remedies of both patentees and 
implementers. Such decisions should be taken by standard-setting 
organizations as part of a dialogue—to the extent participants disagree 
with courts’ interpretive conclusions, they can advocate within standard-
setting organizations for modifying and clarifying the substance of the 
organizations’ intellectual property policies. The jurisdictional rules 
proposed by this Article do not foreclose further dialogue about the 
FRAND commitment’s substantive content, but rather invite more parties 
into the conversation. 
 
                                                     
257. IEEE STANDARDS ASS’N, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES § 6, 
https://standards.ieee.org/about/policies/bylaws/sect6-7.html [https://perma.cc/PUC9-TLQU]. The 
revisions to the IEEE-SA policy included suggestions for the calculation of FRAND royalties, 
clarification that FRAND obligations apply to all licensees on the supply chain, and limitations on 
the pursuit of injunctive relief. See Letter from Renata B. Hesse, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., to Michael A. Lindsay, Esq., Dorsey & Whitney LLP 10 (Feb. 2, 
2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2015/02/02/311470.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U6ZJ-F4WC]. 
258. See, e.g., Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., 773 F.3d 1201, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding 
that trial courts should consider the actual language of the FRAND commitment at issue in instructing 
juries). 
259. But see A. Douglas Melamed & Carl Shapiro, How Antitrust Law Can Make FRAND 
Commitments More Effective, 127 YALE L.J. 2110, 2131 (2017) (expressing skepticism that standard-
setting organizations “can in general be counted on to adopt effective FRAND policies”). 
